Anti-trolling guide

Be aware that message boards are swarming with pro-Kremlin contributors, very likely paid in organised trolling operations. They will spread disinformation which denies the following facts:

-Russia has invaded Ukraine using undeclared, hybrid war

-Ukraine was peaceful for 23 years before this operation began-repeat:there was no war, regardless of whether there was a pro-western or pro-Russian government.

-a majority across Ukraine supported Ukraine's independence and unity before the invasion (now even more do!). This majority includes millions of Russian-speakers who do not want Putin's 'protection'.

-Russia staged a 'referendum at gunpoint' in Crimea, and similar 'elections' recently in Donbas and Luhansk. These lack any democratic legtimacy whatsoever (in any case, what sense is there in a vote to join a country that's not a democracy?)

-since the annexation, Crimean Tatar activists have been tortured and sometimes killed, the Crimean Tatar leader has been exiled from his homeland, and Russians there have even held Nazi-style book burnings of Ukrainian books.

-Euromaidan was, over a period of several weeks, a peaceful demonstration which did, at its fringes, turn violent (long after Yanukovych had already resorted to violence). The protests were visibly home grown-you only had to visit the makeshift camp to see that there was no sophisticated CIA covert op at work.

-America, far from promoting 'regime change' in Ukraine, has pursued over several years an appeasement policy towards Russia, including the 'reset' policy, scrapping the missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and failing to respond robustly to the Russian aggression on Georgian territory in 2008 that untimately lead to the Russia-Georgia war. The EU has done little to encourage Ukraine's European ambitions since the Orange Revolution in 2004, refusing to consider any prospect of EU membership for Ukraine, so the idea that Ukraine's revolution was a 'western-backed coup' doesn't stack up.

-Ukraine's coup was in 2010. Although, President Yanukovych was democratically elected, he proceeded to unconstitutionally take control of Ukraine's parliament by paying deputies to switch sides, and taking control of other state organs such as the Constitutional Court and judiciary in general (hence the Tymoshenko imprisonment). By late 2013, Ukraine's political system had been thoroughly hollowed out and there was little democracy left to speak of.

-It was Yanukovych who started killing his own citizens by shooting 100 dead on Instytutska St. in February this year. There's is a body of evidence that Russia was directly involved in it. A visit to Instytutska St. and a quick inspection of the bullet holes shows that the shots were fired from government buildings. Putin also is responsible for the deaths of his own Russian citizens on Ukrainian soil-estimates of Russian military casualties in Russia's hybrid war on Ukraine number in excess of 4000.

-If Russia left now, the war ends. Simple as that.

Not to say that the Ukrainians are angels. We all know about the record of corruption over Ukraine's 23 year history but, unlike in Russia, Ukrainian society is taking action to at least try to do something about it. The far right in Ukraine is vocal but small, as evidenced by the recent elections which saw barely half a dozen far right deputies elected to parliament, a lot less than in many European countries at the moment. The issue of civilian casualties must be discussed, but put in the context that Russia's proxies position themselves in residential areas precisely to paint this picture. As stated, if Russia pulls the plug on this operation, the fighting will soon stop.

If most of the comments down here aren't worth reading, these examples might give you an idea why:

Fake Ukrainian news sites are being run out of the same office as where the Russians who flood comments section work.

http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/11/19/fake-ukrainian-news-websites-run-by-russian-troll-army-offshoots/

Someone in Russian Foreign Ministry spends his time editing Wikipedia articles about Eastern Ukraine

https://twitter.com/vorobyov/status/534727608475594752/photo/1

Monday last week French paper Le Figaro declined to publish the results of a survey on whether to deliver the Mistral ships to Russia, citing massive automated trolling originating in Russia. Number for yes rose from 60% to 78% overnight...

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/11/17/01003-20141117ARTFIG00218-pourquoi-nous-n-avons-pas-publie-les-resultats-de-notre-derniere-question-du-jour.php

The Quiet Elections

Published in New Eastern Europe 26th September 2014

http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1340-the-quiet-elections

As winter approaches, Ukraine moves to plug its democratic legitimacy gap.

You could forgive the residents of Kiev for having other things on their minds besides the upcoming elections to the Verkhovna Rada. With gas deliveries from Russia having long halted, many Kievans have been living without hot water for the past couple of months as the country tries to fill its gas storage facilities. The annual switching on of the central communal heating system has been delayed two weeks to the beginning of November. Gazprom has reduced its gas deliveries to those countries providing a potential lifeline to Ukraine via a reverse flow, Poland and Slovakia. A Russian government advisor, Sergey Markov, has even predicted that Ukraine’s government will collapse in the winter. As with the prophecies of Ukraine’s descent into “civil war”, Russian predictions are often statements of intent. Ukraine’s government needs to be in the best shape possible if Russia is going to attempt to freeze them out, so questions about its legitimacy matter.

Ukraine is also a country at war. From the mobile mechanisms that enable donations to the Ukrainian army to the men standing on the road collecting money to relentlessly paint the country’s railings and street furniture yellow and blue in defiance of the would-be occupiers, the war is ever present. Where you might have expected to see early discussion about the upcoming elections, TV news reports have unsurprisingly been dominated by the daily national and personal tragedies of the conflict. This has led some commentators to question the wisdom of holding a vote in such circumstances. The presidential elections also took place in a similar situation with election coverage slotted in between the latest news about the Anti-Terror Operation.

President Petro Poroshenko’s strong mandate from this election and his growing reputation with the West have put him in a strong position, although it is bound to have diminished somewhat following the toxic, but perhaps unavoidable, Minsk agreement and the delay to the EU-Ukraine trade agreement (what was simultaneously “signed” September 16th in Kiev and Strasbourg was in fact only around one-fifth of the original Association Agreement text). Beyond the presidency, Ukraine’s democratic credentials don’t look so clever. Ukrainian society has had a new injection of civic activism and engagement, but this is not reflected in the country’s parliament. Unsuspecting politicians may now find themselves being “caught” by journalists in interviews or thrown into skips, but their existence in parliament is not so different as to what it was before.

This situation goes back to the real coup d’etat of Ukrainian politics, the parliamentary coup of 2010, where the Constitutional Court, which had previously ruled otherwise, ruled that deputies were free to move between parliamentary factions. Whilst this is entirely acceptable in constituency-based systems like the UK, Ukraine’s deputies had been elected on a closed list system, so changing factions was like your vote growing legs and walking away from you, and hence Yanukovych induced deputies from the Orange parties of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko to form a loyalist parliament on which to build his power vertical. The turncoat deputies were dubbed “tushki”, or animal carcasses.

The victory of the EuroMaidan might have ushered in a new era of openness and civic engagement but, as Yanukovych fled the country, something not very dissimilar took place in the current parliament. As the emergency government formed around Prime Minister Aresiny Yatsenyuk and Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, deputies, particularly those from the Party of Regions, hurried to either join the new bloc or become independent. Thus, whilst Poroshenko is the legitimately elected President, the parliament we see today is in fact little more than a group of “reverse tushki”. So whilst the new government is clearly no “junta”, it certainly has a democratic legitimacy problem that successful parliamentary elections are absolutely vital to solve.  

The current parliament has also inherited its predecessor’s poor standards of parliamentary procedure. The practice of piano player voting, where deputies push the voting buttons of their missing colleagues, still continues. The recent vote on the ceasefire law was held in a closed session and rumours abound that the screen that shows the voting results might even have been tampered with. Perhaps there is an argument that in the time of war certain measures must be pushed through (many democracies experience a temporary democratic deficit in times of war), but such actions are unlikely to give Ukraine’s democracy a clean bill of health.

In addition to the oncoming freeze and parliament’s democratic inadequacies, Poroshenko must be aware that his initial popularity can quickly nosedive in Ukraine. The support for Yushchenko had all but evaporated within six months as president. Therefore, Poroshenko must see the need to use what momentum he still has as quickly as possible. Current polls back his bloc to do well, despite recent controversial decisions.

There are some ways in which the elections will not be a departure from the Yanukovych era. They will be held under the same election law as the 2012 poll, a mixture of party list and geographical constituency mandates that was designed to skew the vote in Yanukovych’s favour. Clearly, elections for the electoral districts in the occupied territories will not take place, meaning out of 450 seats, 15-20 will be empty. In one sense, maintaining those “empty chairs” would be a powerful symbol that these regions remain, in the sense of international law, part of Ukraine. Ukraine must feel a duty to continue to represent those regions in some way. This is perhaps reflected in the fact that Mustafa Dzhemilev, exiled head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, itself now facing the prospect of exile, is on Poroshenko’s electoral list.

As in the previous elections, oligarchic clans are still likely to figure prominently, but this time different clans stand to benefit. Whereas at previous elections the Donbas clan came to the fore, they are now variously exiled or in the quagmire of the Russian-sponsored breakaway entity now being established there, although some are rumoured to be funding the Party of Development which is emerging from the ruins of the Party of Regions. It will be fascinating to see the extent to which Russian aggression and occupation have sliced through Ukraine’s traditional pro-western/pro-Russian cleavage. In the new parliament, Poroshenko and Dnipropetrovsk-based Ihor Kolomoyskyi look like the potential big winners. Parties and party groupings continue to be fluid even with just a month left to go. Vitali Klitschko’s UDAR has merged into Poroshenko’s group of pragmatists, whilst others collect around Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party or the slowly climbing People’s Front, Yatsenyuk’s new party. Figures from Ukraine’s past have apparently been manoeuvring themselves onto party lists by various means, but this will be a gamble, assuming the vote is substantially free and fair. Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party may conceivably even struggle to enter parliament.

Each western-leaning party will also have a handful of Maidan activists towards the top of its lists who may or may not turn out to be capable politicians, but should at least look on parliament’s procedural deficiencies in a new light. However, despite a myriad of options on the ballot paper, the party system arguably still will not be offering choices that truly reflect voters’ needs and preferences. Large shares of the vote at the previous election for the far right Svoboda and the first banned, now unbanned, Communists alarmed observers in 2012, but suggest that for many Ukrainians ideology is important, just as for other Europeans. The persistence of so-called “virtual parties” built around clans or individuals does little address this need.

It seems that Ukrainians continue to misguidedly seek the “good politician”, whereas evidence of the reform process across Central Eastern Europe tells us that in most cases it is the political system, not the quality of its politicians that is the decisive factor in reform-making, specifically the parliamentary system of the government. If Ukraine is to truly succeed, its political system needs to be a radical departure from anything seen thus far in the post-Soviet space.

As things stand, expect a quiet election as Ukrainians continue to fight and die for their country and for Ukraine’s political system to take incremental steps forward, if they can survive the winter.

Debunking so-called 'stop the war' coalition's '5 facts'

This is a brief response to debunk the '5 facts' article the so-called 'stop the war' coalition posted today. Although it barely dignifies a response, I feel duty-bound.

For the record, I opposed the 2003 Iraq invasion and supported the work they did then, but if Putin succeeds, with the help of poorly informed UK citizens susceptible to Russia's propaganda machine, we'll end up with war that makes Iraq 2003 look like a playground fight.

Point 1: Countries joined NATO of their own accord. Why were countries like Poland & the Baltics so keen to join? Because they understand Russia much better than you do

Point 2:How can an organisation that purports to be left wing prop up Russian ethno-nationalist arguments? People in Ukraine are from a variety of backgrounds but want to be Ukrainian-ethnicity is not the issue. A great many Russian-speakers living in Ukraine don't want to live in a dictatorship like Russia or Belarus.

Point 3:The EU's Association Agreement was a 'do minimum' option by Brussels,who for 10 years offered Ukraine virtually nothing.

Point 4:more than half a million protested in Maidan entirely peacefully.Plenty of people wanted to see Yanukovych go, not just far right fringe. What you don't realise is that the 'coup' was Yanukovych's. Upon seizing power in 2010 he illegally took control of parliament & gutted the country's institutions

Point 5:How do you account for 23 years of peace in Ukraine that were only broken 'coincidentally' with the arrival of Russian fighters & arms?

So basically, the '5 facts' don't stack up.

P.S. The article references another article by Stephen Cohen, who some may not be aware is a notorious Putin apologist, irrespective of people killed or planes shot down etc.

Crimea adds to reasons for nations to skip 2018 & 2022 World Cups

With FIFA credibility at rock bottom, Russia and Qatar both morally untenable, and that winter World Cup, should our nations even go to 2018 & 2022? And what's Crimea got to do with it?

FIFA knows it's virtually impossible to boycott a World Cup, unless you're a housewife who goes to one of those World Cup matinée showings at the local cinema. Despite a barrage of criticism of FIFA's shady goings on, Gary Lineker most recently getting in on the act, FIFA, rather like Vladimir Putin, look set to carry on regardless.

There were already many large clouds gathering over FIFA before this summer. As John Oliver's first class putdown of FIFA on the eve of this year's tournament basically said, if you're a football fan it's in a way better not to know. Brazil 2014 was, on the pitch, a resounding success, with some compelling games. Off it, the picture didn't look so clever. Many Brazilians had put the boot in on the project long before their team's infamous 7-1 defeat.

The FIFA bribery scandal is covered elsewhere by those that know far more about it than me, but suffice it to say that, if Qatar is guilty of giving bribes to get the 2022 World Cup, and not forgetting that Russia was awarded the 2018 World Cup at the exact same FIFA Congress in 2010, some further dots may need to be joined up there. Franz Beckenbauer's suspension for not complying with FIFA's internal investigation has something of the air of a Putin-style scapegoating of some low-ranking official.  

The Qatar decision has brought with it all manner of strife. At present FIFA appears to be procrastinating over whether to upset Europe's clubs and associations and their calendars by holding a winter World Cup, or whether to chance the fate of millionaire footballers in the summer desert temperatures, which seems increasingly unlikely. Again, many are doing a far better job than me highlighting the dreadful human rights situation in the country and the horrendous working conditions of the migrant workers who are building the facilities.

There was already a lobby against the holding of the 2018 World Cup in Russia which had been exponentially growing with Russia's annexation of Crimea and its instigation of terrorism and armed insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, added to the remnants of the anti-Sochi campaign appalled by Russia's gay rights situation. Then, with the shooting down of MH17, citizens and families of nationals from Holland, Australia, Malaysia and the UK were suddenly thrust into the world Ukrainians have been living in since November last year, and Chechens very much longer. All of a sudden politicians from those countries were talking tough about taking the World Cup away from Russia. Who's to say if they will keep it up?

Russia 2018 also faces practical problems. Visiting teams basing themselves in Crimea looks a non-starter as non-recognition policy is already beginning to restrict the ability of airlines to fly there. Russia itself is already starting to turn the screw on World Cup sponsor McDonald's (even Coca Cola is not safe, not to mention iPhones and iPads). Russia is busy banning products and this is likely to push up prices. Airlines may not be able to fly over Siberia to get to the tournament. After Euromaidan, political change in Russia is also not out of the question. Somebody somewhere in FIFA must be a bit jittery about all this, but publicly there seems little concern.

Many believe that there is about as much chance of FIFA moving the 2018 or 2022 World Cups as there is of Formula 1 missing out Bahrain or Sochi from its race calendar. At least F1 chief Bernie Ecclestone is blunt, if morally bankrupt, on human rights issues affecting host countries, whilst FIFA loftily proclaims that the World Cup can 'bring positive change'. If that's the kind of 'positive change' the Sochi Winter Olympics brought, then sorry, we don't want it.

So, think about this, in particular if you are, for example, the English FA. You have already been deprived of hosting a World Cup in what was quite possibly a corrupt voting process, and your leagues and clubs are not happy at all about the impending 2022 winter World Cup. FIFA has taken hold of world football when in fact it is the national leagues and the Champions' League which are the sport's bread and butter. Couldn't the various associations quite easily get together and pledge to run a rival competition for 2018 & 2022?

I would personally be more than happy to see Europe's great sides (Germany, Holland etc.) take a decision for the greater good of football and humanity, and simply decide not to send their teams to either of these World Cups (I'd also like to see the USA, Australia and England do the same, but if it was only those 3 most would assume they just hadn't qualified). The English FA seem more worried about demolishing the English lower leagues with Premier League B teams than whether or not the World Cup will be played in climatic or political conditions safe for their players. As with all things it seems, Germany is the key. If the defending champions didn't show up, what sort of World Cup would that be? Kazakhstan v Vietnam anyone?

Doubting even that as the force to topple FIFA's falkekirche, what about the law? Is there a legal basis to at least get Russia stripped of the 2018 World Cup and hope the corruption issues are exposed in time to spare us a World Cup under the blankets in 2022? The answer may lie in Crimea.


Crimea: What happened to FIFA and UEFA's own rules?

Whilst not the most illustrious footballing outpost, the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea is another moral test case for both FIFA and European football governing body UEFA. That's because, a few years ago both organisations made some rules, which they enforced too.

As recently as 2010, France was threatened over what FIFA calls political interference in football. Some countries, such as Brunei and Kenya, have even had their football associations and national teams suspended over it. Presumably hosting a World Cup under such circumstances would be out of the question. Early reports after Crimea annexation, regarding Tavriya Simferopol in particular, suggested that, until the UN rules that Crimea is part of Russia, the clubs would prefer to stay in the Ukrainian league. However, one of the earliest voices, back in late March when the dust was still settling, to claim that Crimean teams would be playing in the Russian league was Russia's Sports Minister, Vitaly Mukto (FIFA later claimed they had given no such consent). A FIFA letter as recently as early June seemed to confirm what we all know-Crimean football is Ukrainian football. The clubs were affiliated to the Ukrainian FA, so their fate was none of Russia's business.

The solution has in fact been to unceremoniously kill off two football clubs, Tavriya Simferopol and FK Sevastopol, and place three new entities into the Russian 2nd division, created under 'Russian law'. What 'Russian law' means in a territory not internationally recognised as Russia is an open question. As Russia is not a democracy, we will probably never know precisely what forces were brought to bear, but it looks as if political interference, which has pervaded every aspect of life in Crimea since March, looks highly likely.

For some, the issue has been kicked into the long grass by the fact that whilst Tavriya played in European competition as recently as 2010, the peninsula's fans are now unlikely to see European football there for the foreseeable future, but this is not just about which country the team represents in European competition. If the move is allowed to stand, what will be the fallout for football in general?

That's where UEFA comes in. When Evian were promoted to the French top division, and lacking the facilities to match, they more than once sought to play home games just across the border at the much flashier Stade de Genève in Geneva, a request which UEFA denied in 2013 on the following very clear basis:

"Though sympathetic to the predicament of the club, Platini pointed out UEFA regulations do not allow clubs to play their games in national competitions outside the confines of their country's borders."

So that seems very clear. Even if one is sympathetic to Russia's wishes (and, by the way, none of us are), rules are rules. Crimea is not internationally recognised as part of Russia and UEFA is an international organisation.

Of course there are exceptions that every football anorak knows. Teams from Lichtenstein and San Marino play in neighbours' national leagues, Berwick Rangers are based in England but play in the Scottish league, and most notably, Swansea City play in the English Premier League with a handful of clubs scattered further down the English football pyramid. However, that's no justification for the Russian league's move. First of all, such a move was never made unilaterally by a single association. In fact, what was once perhaps unfairly dubbed the Comical League of Wales (Konica the unfortunate inaugural sponsor) came into being over strained relations over the very issues of where teams from a particular country play, and the possible knock-on threat to Wales's national side. All but four of the Welsh clubs in the English league were ordered to join the Welsh league, and many played in exile in England as the dispute rumbled on. 

In the end it was recognised that Cardiff, Swansea and Wrexham would be cutting their own throats giving up playing in the English league to play in basically a semi-professional league, rather like Tavriya and Sevastopol will be doing playing 'Torpedo Armavir' and 'Mashuk-KMV' instead of Dynamo Kiev and Shakhtar Donetsk, not to mention the 12 hour wait for the ferry from Kerch. I bet their fans are really excited. Many fans, most notably Tavriya's ultras (who were loyal backers of the Euromaidan protests) have no desire to watch Russian lower league football.

Alas there's not much optimism that UEFA will take a principled stance on Crimea either, particularly being that the Russian government's energy arm Gazprom sponsors its flagship Champions' League. And there we all were wondering why Gazprom would bother sponsoring the Champions' League. Isn't that clever? Match ticket €40. Replica shirt €60. Cutting off Ukraine's gas in winter? Priceless.

Will the Ukrainian FA challenge it? They should. Gibraltar took their case for FIFA/UEFA membership to the Court of Arbitration for Sport where they finally got justice. Kosovo are still battling for full FIFA membership. These things take time. They are not simply decided unilaterally by a single national football association under political coercion.

Current situation in Luhansk

From a friend who has close family in the area:

What they don't talk about on BBC: Lugansk (my hometown in the east of Ukraine) is now fully blocked by pro-Russian terrorists. There's currently no electricity or running water supply, no Internet, mobile or landline connection. People are completely cut off from the rest of the world. Those who try to leave through the so-called green corridor, risk being shot by the terrorists, vehicles are often confiscated and volunteers are kidnapped. Food and water supplies are scarce. Shelling doesn't cease throughout the day, people are too afraid to go outside and often spend days hiding in air raid shelters. Those with serious health problems are dying because they can't get medication. And it's just one town in Eastern Ukraine. Now, what is it but Russia-orchestrated genocide of the 21st century?

Ukraine voters can put Ukraine on the path to democratic legitimacy

Ukraine's presidential election is the first step to solving its government's legitimacy problem

It has not been an easy start for Ukraine's new authorities, who have had to deal with annexation, armed insurgency, rescuing the national economy from the precipice and organising a presidential election no less. A baptism of fire by anyone's standards. The annexation of Crimea came when the new incumbents had barely sat at their desks. The violent provocations in the east and south of the country are unprecedented in Ukraine's 23 years of independence, whilst Russia has a 23 year track record of violence in the Caucasus and terrorism in its cities. Draw your own conclusions about where this outbreak of 'civil war' in Ukraine has in fact come from. 

 

To add to that, the current authorities have absurdly and maliciously been labeled a 'junta' by pro-Moscow tweeters and bloggers scratching around for a smear term (the only true junta that has ever existed in Eastern Europe was the early 80s junta in Poland, which was backed by the USSR), part of a well worn tradition of concept stretching by Russia. Kiev is not a 'junta' any more than Greenpeace activists are 'pirates' or 'hooligans', or indeed gay rights campaigners 'propagandists'. Despite this however, it is true enough to say that the government since its traumatic beginnings has lacked true democratic legitimacy, and therefore Sunday's presidential elections are the crucial first step in solving a legitimacy problem with Ukraine's governance which in fact goes back to 2010.

 

When Viktor Yanukovych was elected President in early 2010, parliament was still under the mandate of the 'orange parties' of Prime Minister Tymoshenko and former President Yushchenko. What then followed was a spectacular capitulation of the whole constitutional order. The Constitutional Court, re-stuffed with judges loyal to Yanukovych, ruled that parliamentary deputies could now switch sides, the problem being that, with Ukraine's closed list electoral system, this is  tantamount to your vote growing legs and walking away from you. The defectors were dubbed 'tushki', a term meaning animal corpse. The standard of parliamentarianism thereafter soon became abysmal, with 'piano playing' (deputies pressing the voting buttons of absent members), as in the Russian Duma, becoming standard practice, and even savage beatings meted out to Yanukovych opponents. Votes were sometimes registered for MPs who were not even in the country at the time. The 2012 parliamentary elections followed electoral reforms designed to favour the President's Party of Regions. The introduction of a proportion of constituency MPs favoured the ruling parties, and electoral commissions were staffed by personnel from these same ruling parties. Unlike the previous three national elections (two parliamentary, one presidential, the election was not judged internationally to have been free and fair.

 

Fast forward to February this year, and whilst the voice of the people was finally being heard, the speed with which MPs hurriedly switched sides again following Yanukovych's exit in February was, constitutionally speaking, little better than the 'tushki' of four years earlier. Just as in 2010 a 'winner takes all' mentality saw now vulnerable deputies scrambling to save their careers and positions. There was of course a huge difference however. The new authorities from the outset took power on the promise of elections. We must remember that if not for Euromaidan, Ukraine might now have been looking ahead to years or decades without such free elections, the situation which predominates in the countries of the Customs Union that Yanukovych would have taken them into, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan 

 

What must follow these elections is constitutional reform that will guard against the monopolisation and abuse of power of the past several years. Ukraine should adopt a parliamentary system, the kind which has lead successful reforms in the likes of Poland or Czech Republic, and resist the urge to revert to the presidential model which has in contrast failed its citizens so miserably in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine must also figure out how it manages its multiculturalism without allowing the country to disintegrate. There is scope for delegating local language and schooling policy to muncipal level, as well as the dvisive issue of historical commemorations, but Ukraine lacks the political maturity for full blown federalism, so this should wait for now. Fears about Ukraine becoming a series of fiefdoms under that scenario are well founded.

 

It is also a sobering reality that they will have to face their challenges largely without the backing of the international community. Whilst the European Union has rightly put on the table a deal to allow Ukraine to access the internal market, there is plenty from member states to suggest that the EU's backing can't be relied upon, owing to the EU member states' deep ties to Russia. Whether it be German industry, French warships, Spanish ports or London's financial sector, there is little suggest that these countries will do very much to support the freedom of Ukrainians. Ukraine's road ahead looks a lonely one. The new President will need all the collective wisdom he can muster.

 

The presidential election must be followed as soon as possible by a parliamentary one. A proportion of constituency mandates must be maintained to represent occupied Crimea and the districts currently ravaged by the Russian-sponsored insurgency. The new parliament must adhere to new standards of parliamentarianism so that the abuses of the past four years cannot be repeated. If it does this, the legitimacy problem can finally be consigned to history.

Europe's New Northern Cyprus?

Non-recognition of Crimea's status as part of Russia must be more than just words

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Western leaders have all been quick to proclaim non-recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Yet just days after what could only very charitably be called a referendum on Crimea joining Russia (including a creditable 123% vote in favour in Simferopol and minus any option to remain in the country it has existed in for the past two decades) it seems the world is grudgingly accepting the inevitable, having offered only meagre sanctions, and apparently relieved that Russia appears to have settled for 'only Crimea'. If they're not careful their 'no business as usual' mantra will soon sound as tired and hollow as their 'red lines'.

In truth, Russia would probably have annexed it or set up a breakaway state there along with Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early '90s had it not massively underestimated Ukraine's divergent political direction from that of Russia. It's difficult to see whether this will fulfil Putin's aim of bringing Ukraine as a whole 'back into the fold'; the two countries now have different sides of a historical grievance to rally around.


In the here and now, clearly the most immediate pressing concern is Ukraine's isolated military units in the peninsula. Whilst both their fortitude and restraint are commendable, there is no international military backing for them whatsoever, and if more of their lives are to be spared, it seems inevitable they will have to withdraw.

Then we must consider the issue of status. There is little prospect of a treaty or formal agreement here. Making any such agreement with Russia would be a catch 22, as making any new agreement would involve formally tearing up a previous one (the 1994 Budapest Memorandum). In so doing, what possible validity could a new agreement have if it could be torn up so easily? Therefore non-recognition seems the only way forward.

For this non-recognition to make any sense however we need to figure out what non-recognition will mean in practice. Non-recognition is absolutely right, but the problem is that if Crimea is treated as a part of the Russian Federation it basically will be.  So the wherewithal of non-recognition and how it could work needs to be figured out quite quickly. As an example, Northern Cyprus is never shown on basic maps as anything other than part of the Republic of Cyprus, and this has never lapsed in 40 years. There was for a long time even a trade ban on the export of Northern Cyprus products, abolished only in 2003. Here Greece was the force to push this forward. Ukraine will be in a stronger position to push once the DCFTA with the EU is up and running.

As regards measures on the ground, non-recognition might involve cutting transport links. It seems to me that it would be adding insult to injury to allow Russian Railways to continue to operate trains to Crimea, merely 'transiting' Ukraine proper, and this is an obvious means of sanctioning the tourism industry there. There is a case for cutting rail links between Crimea and mainland Ukraine altogether in fact. In the case of Northern Cyprus, only flights from Turkey can fly into the territory. The same blockade might be enacted by the international community here. Alternative connections could be built up via, for example, Odessa.

Energy and water are also key issues. Many have pointed out that, with the ability to cut off the peninsula's water and electricity, Kiev has a potential card to play. If the prospect of a gas cut off rears its head once more, this is obviously an option. There will have to be some restraint however. A closure of the border similar to the closure the Spanish inflicted on Gibraltar for many years would only hurt families on both sides.

There should be vigorous public campaigns against organisations endorsing the change. For example, early rumours that National Geographic is to change its map may be the start of a capitulation that must be resisted through any means available. Disregarding all other arguments, it can simply be pointed out that no major power has recognised the occupation and that the case is yet to go before the International Court of Justice.


Sport is also a factor. UEFA could play a useful role in non-recognition of Crimea's Russian status. Tavriya Simferopol and FK Sevastopol currently play in the Ukrainian Premier League and should continue to do so, and UEFA has the power to make such decisions. In in albeit more innocuous example, France's Evian TG FC were refused permission to play home games across the Swiss border in Geneva as it was in another state. On this basis UEFA should refuse to allow any teams from Crimea to participate in the Russian league structure, and threaten trouble if they do, with Russia's participation in the 2014 and hosting of the 2018 tournament potentially at risk. FIFA has always taken a hard line on political interference in the running of football (at least with African countries) so it should be difficult for Russia to force UEFA's or FIFA's hand. 

Finally, there is the question of the endgame. Even the most optimistic would be hard pressed to think that Crimea will ever truly return to Ukrainian rule. Whilst before the Russian intervention it seems there wasn't a majority in favour of Russian rule, it will be equally difficult several years down the line to expect a majority to be in favour of Ukrainian rule. But it is reasonable to hope for a more legitimate settlement in Crimea in future. Little will be possible without democracy, and with Putin's situation apparently strengthened, there is little hope for the time being, but this illustrates the need for non-recognition to be maintained, for decades if need be, as with Northern Cyprus.

What Crimeans need to realise is that the dismantling of the Ukrainian letters on the front of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea represents, in effect, the dismantling of autonomy. The Russian Federation is a federation in name only, and Putin has progressively abolished autonomy across the country during his rule. A once ambitious plan for Kaliningrad, for example, to be a 'Baltic Republic' using both the rouble and the Euro and forming a gateway to the EU was, with Putin's accession to power, promptly shelved. Look at Kaliningrad now-a neglected backwater from which Russians flock across the border to shop at cheaper Polish supermarkets. Crimea is also, for now, doomed to become such a backwater, and they will see that last week's fake foray into democracy bears little relation to the future, where elections will offer no genuine choice and factual information, from a media which has moved from bias to full on North Korea style propaganda, will be scarce.

In a post-Putin scenario however, the issue will almost certainly be revisited. It could be argued that, in a democratised Russia, if given true autonomy, with full language rights for minorities, there would be little reason to complain about Russian rule. If Tatar, for example, appeared on bilingual street signs alongside Russian, few could complain. Another proposal might be independence, and a parallel might be drawn with Slovakia, where a 10% Hungarian minority, despite many tensions, ensures that the rights of minorities are addressed. An independent Crimea would have a 15% Tatar minority and a significant Ukrainian population, so in a democratic scenario, the communities would each have to be taken seriously. If by then however the non-recognition policy has lapsed, that opportunity will be lost.

Remember that after three decades of occupation, the Turkish population of Northern Cyprus in 2004 actually voted in favour of reunion with the south. Many of them have taken Republic of Cyprus citizenship (not surprisingly as this is also EU citizenship). Ukraine should consider changing the law to allow dual citizenship for all those in Crimea who wish to remain Ukrainian (it would also be in the wider interests of a country which has consistently lost citizens since 1991). A lot depends on the capacity of Ukrainians to build a successful country that will weaken the will of Crimeans to keep it in Putin's prison. If the EU follows through and grants visa free travel to Ukrainians, as it will do for Moldovans this May, the idea of having a 'Russkiy pasport' already begins to lose its appeal. For Crimea, it might be the beginning of a long road back.

How to hurt Putin

Sign the Association Agreement

The best thing the EU could do is get Acting President Turchynov on a plane to Brussels as soon as possible and sign the Association Agreement. The EU has shown itself over the past 3 months to be an utterly incompetent foreign policy actor. The extra powers won at Lisbon look ill-deserved, the posts of Foreign Policy Representative and EU President worthy of abolition at the next treaty change. However, the EU still has a massive tool at its disposal. The whole point of the Kremlin’s crusade all along has been to prevent the signing of the AA and to ensure Ukraine was on the path to the Eurasian Union, so signing the agreement would be a blow to Putin in no uncertain terms. It might even stabilise the situation across Ukraine and give opponents of the occupiers in Crimea a concrete reason to hang on to their Ukrainian passports. The Kremlin delights in knowing the west will never act so quickly and decisively. Oh that we could.

Close the Bosphorous to Russian shipping

Turkey has a role to play here, and a right to do so on a number of counts. Firstly, the Crimean Tatars, whose future inside a Russia with an awful minority rights record looks potentially appalling, are the Turks’ ethnic kin (as place names such as Kazantip or Bağçasaray bear clear testament to), so arguably Turkey has a moral obligation here, and the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey itself would support this. Turkey's media is already claiming, rather in the way that Spain does with Gibraltar, that if Crimea breaks away, it should legally revert to Turkish rule. Although that's practically impossible, it does help to legtimise Turkish involvement. Secondly, Putin’s support for Assad has had direct consequences for Turkey, bringing with it massive refugee problems. Thirdly, Russia’s asserting itself on the Black Sea has major implications for the Black Sea security situation. Turkey should close off the Bosphorous to Russian shipping and insist on a place at the table if there is mediation. Or at the very least, Russian ships passing through the straits (there have been two in recent days) ought to be 'escorted' by their Turkish counterparts. One of two warships dispatched to the fringe of the region would also concentrate minds in Moscow. Erdoğan would probably appreciate a distraction from domestic issues, including a corruption probe. They might not have a spotless record themselves on human rights, but at the moment Ukraine should take all the help it can get.

Sanctions

An obvious one, but it took a very long time indeed and many deaths before it really looked like becoming a reality for the orchestrators of the violent crackdown in Kiev. It has been claimed however, by Mikhail Saakashvili for example, that it was the crystalising of the threat of sanctions that finally lead to the collapse of Yanukovych's house of cards. Sanctions against Russian officials might also try the patience of many of Putin's backers. There is also the potential for broader economic sanctions, and with the Russian economy now on the ropes, their impact might be felt quickly.

Parliamentary or bust

Ukraine’s new political system must be a radical departure from anything seen in the post-Soviet space

It’s not new for Ukrainians to want change. Just 9 years ago, it seemed the country was embarking on a change of direction and hopes were high. This time there is caution, and remembrance that the cost this time was far higher. The frosty reception Tymoshenko has received following her release is the clearest indication of a wholehearted desire to ‘clean house’. Ukrainians at least know what they don’t want. But May’s elections will come soon and somebody needs to be steering the ship, however imperfect. Ukraine has before it a fresh sheet of paper, but it cannot aspire to build anyone’s utopia. Inclusivity and compromise are now the keys to the country’s survival and future prosperity.

One massive challenge is to engender a culture of constitutionalism. The current authorities face a legitimacy crisis. The capitulation of the previous authorities and their voting in significant numbers for new laws has created a disconcerting reverse of the ‘tushki’ phenomenon of 2010. The relationship between deputies and their electoral mandates is now tenuous, not forgetting that the parliamentary elections of 2012 were held to poor democratic standards. If Freedom House were to assess the country today, it would not be classed as free. It obviously all depends now on the coming May elections.

The first lesson that has to be learned is that politics can’t be any more about the personalities. The post-Soviet reflex of looking to a ‘strong leader’ has had disastrous results across the region for all to see. It’s time to challenge the Eurasian myth that ‘we are different’. This myth has already cost too many people in Eurasia their lives and freedoms.

Ukraine has to adopt a wholly parliamentary system of government of the type found across most of Europe. The President should be left only with the power of veto and to call new elections. A strong Prime Minister can adopt a ‘presidential style’, like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair, but note Thatcher’s political demise in 1990. She was the ‘iron lady’, but when she lost the support of her party the power drained out of her overnight. It has been objectively shown that parliamentary systems, which have to by necessity take account of a wider range of stakeholders, have a better record of achieving reforms.

The party system needs reform too. Ukraine must ditch the ‘virtual parties’ which revolve solely around personalities and business interests, and embrace ideology. The high percentage of votes at the last election for the far left (Communists) and far right (Svoboda), although perhaps regrettable, told us that at least a quarter of Ukrainian voters chose to vote along ideological lines. We need to give the more moderate centre left and centre right populations that voice too. We will have to work with those who we may not totally agree with, but a party is a coalition of interests.

To have a parliamentary system also means adherence to parliamentary rules. Post-May 2014 there should be zero tolerance of ‘piano playing’, violence in the chamber, blocking the rostrum, or any such activities. Perhaps the Verkhovna Rada needs to be ‘refereed’, with deputies suspended for some time for breaches of protocol. Otherwise, the temptation to cut corners will be very acute, and we see clearly now the result.

To preserve the unity of Ukraine, we must think about how to bring all into the political process. There is a dilemma here. There is an imperative to establish new ground rules for politics in Ukraine, and that means a new constitution. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is calling for the new constitution to be established only after elections, and for it to be subject to a referendum. That might sound reasonable enough, but there is a problem. If we look at how Yanukovych was able to take a wrecking ball to Ukraine’s constitutional structure in 2010, there is a strong argument for having the new rules in place first, but of course to have legitimacy, the whole country must be involved.

The oligarchs have a role to play here. They can continue to play a strong and influential role, just as wealthy backers of, for example, the Republicans do in America. However, in terms of the country’s assets they have to accept that their cup run is over. The EU could play a pivotal role here. Mikhael Saakashvili spoke recently about how the concrete threat of sanctions was a tipping point for many of Yanukovych’s supporters to pull the plug. If that threat hung over economic and political abuses more generally, this would limit the business elite to a role which was powerful but not excessive. What complicates this is the role of those oligarchs who failed to withdraw backing from the previous regime even as the situation deteriorated. It is more difficult to make a moral case for their continued involvement in the country’s politics, although we may find that it’s unavoidable.

How to accommodate the country’s regional differences needs much thought. At this time Ukraine lacks the political maturity for federalism, which would also leave parts of the country too vulnerable to outside interference. However, in issues such as language rights, it may make sense to allow some discretion at local level. In France, for example, minority languages can appear on street signs at the behest of local municipalities as long as the national language is also displayed (and the local municipality pays for it). This might actually be a good exercise in local democracy. Responsibility for celebrations of historical events, whether it be 9 May or the Ukrainian insurgency, should also be managed at local level, as nationally these issues have proved too divisive. Such emotive issues should not be propagandist fodder or tools for the country’s politicians any longer.

Some of the biggest issues still remain unanswered. Most significant is the threat to jobs in Eastern Ukraine from Putin’s now inevitable trade blockade. How do we explain to these people that this is not a reason to support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, or to oppose democracy? Rather, it is an outrage that Putin is so content to exploit their jobs as a political tool, and they should be more angry about this than anyone. The impending gas price hikes are also a concern, although contingency plans such as reverse flow from Slovakia ought to now face fewer obstacles.

In dealings with Russia trust will be at an all time low, and Ukraine needs to protect itself. For the foreseeable future all high level talks between Ukraine and Russia should be hosted by a third country and adhere to diplomatic norms. We must not allow the degeneration into secret meetings and bullying that Putin-Yanukovych relations became. Plenty of work is needed into how to make Russia-Ukraine relations more transparent. The extent of Russian sabotage in Ukraine’s internal governance over the past several years is plain to see. More discussions need to be on the record and subjected to the greatest scrutiny.

Ukraine also needs to continue much of the patient hard work that in fact many of its institutions have already been doing. In the sphere of defence, it is rarely mentioned that the country, even under Yanukovych, was forming ever greater co-operation with NATO in many areas, and the previously announced transition to a professional army will probably now come to pass. European integration policy will also be salvageable after its 3 month hiatus, and with political will from the top the technical work will be able to proceed all the better.

Despite this, Ukrainians now realise that the future depends on them. The EU would be greatly welcomed as a guarantor to Ukraine’s European future, but it cannot be wholly relied upon. Following the logic of Saakashvili’s comments, had they acted earlier in the crisis, 100 more Ukrainians might still be alive today.

    

Europe's Tiananmen Must be Stopped

Some thoughts on the Ukraine crisis that I'm not hearing addressed elsewhere.


This is serious

• The clearing of Maidan would be Europe's Tiananmen Square. Europe will bear responsibility for not preventing it.

The fall of Kiev's Lenin monument, just like the fall of Budapest's Stalin statue in 1956, may not be the harbinger of victory. The Tiananmen Square protests lasted 7 weeks, with students occupying the square as Kiev's activists do now. The appearance of military vehicles on Kiev's streets evoked memories of the man who famously blocked a tank in the protests. Tens of people died in the resulting crackdown. I don't think Europe realises that they might be about to watch something similar happening on their watch. Yanukovych has already shown he is willing to militarise the city with snipers, live bullets and combat vehicles. It's uncomfortable. We wish it weren't true, but it is. Europe regrets Yugoslavia. That conflict led to a sense of moral responsibility to bring the Western Balkans into the EU accession process, but the same moral responsibility did not extend to post Orange Revolution Ukraine. That now looks like a colossal mistake. Do we want 20 years on to create more regrets for ourselves?


Sideline the EU

• Calling on the EU to help has exhausted itself. The focus needs to switch to governments of European countries instead.

Successive European treaties and treaty negotiations have long advocated greater powers, with Europe still haunted by its lack of capacity to act in Yugoslavia. Politicians spoke of European armies. These efforts finally culminated in the post of Foreign Policy Representative being created, the 'single telephone number' (in Ashton's case only until 8pm of course). The Ukraine crisis in fact shows that the EU had no business asking for greater competence in foreign policy at Lisbon. Although foreign policy competence of technically speaking ‘remains with member states’, even the pretention of EU foreign policy seems to be a pointless folly. In actual fact, it means people ‘calling on the EU’, which suits the interests of disinterested, toothless, or Russia-friendly governments, providing them with a screen for member states to hide behind. I'm beginning to think the EU should abandon its grand ambitions and revert to a looser trade pact (or be replaced by something else). Greater intergration seems to actually render it impotent altogether. And its not the fault of enlargement-some of the most vocal countries on the crisis are the newer members (e.g. Poland). It is only with a push from a Merkel, Hollande, or a Cameron that we might see the EU initiate sanctions, so it’s them that we should be holding to account for doing or not doing so.

Russian involvement

• Claims of Russian Federation personnel on Kiev’s streets, if true, urgently need to be substantiated.

We seem to know very little indeed of Russia’s direct involvement in the events in Kiev. Publicly they ‘watch with concern’, and simultaneously speak to world media about the crisis whilst their own tv channels variously downplay or grossly twist the truth of what’s happening in Kiev. Knowing from the debacle in November that set this whole thing in motion that Russia-Ukraine relations are totally untransparent, and that Yanukovych is inevitably getting desperate, it’s inconceivable that Russia is not involved in it somewhere. It might be intelligence support, assistance with cyber attacks. Who knows? I am only speculating. Most worrying are suggestions that some of the ‘Berkut’ (‘special assignment’ police forces) on the streets of Kiev are in fact Russian Berkut in Ukraine uniforms. One estimate on twiiter claimed that 8000 had been counted, but that Ukraine’s total number of Berkut amounts to only around 4000. Much earlier on, observers pointed out that Russian-speaking Berkut struggled to communicate with Ukrainian-speaking activists, difficult to account for as even Russian speakers in Ukraine are exposed to Ukrainian on a daily basis. It's entirely fair to say that it's unlikely to be true. However, such reports, if true, need to be substantiated urgently, as it would have massive implications. If Euromaidan was to be cleared by 4000 in fact Russian Berkut, it’s tantamount to sending tanks into Kiev by stealth.

 

The Sochi Factor

• Sochi 2014 gives Ukraine another 2 weeks’ grace

A window of opportunity exists now to solve the Ukraine crisis without direct Russian involvement, as Russia will never embark on a ‘Georgia 2008’ whilst its pet prestige project Sochi 2014, and associated global charm offensive, is taking place. It should be clear that Russia’s prisoner releases were, as Pussy Riot wasted no time in telling us, a publicity stunt. Many less high profile prisoners in Russia have been less fortunate, and perhaps the Russian authorities couldn’t quite hang on in letting on that Khodorkovsky will still need to be neutralized as a force, most likely unable to return. Once Sochi finishes, the gloves will be off once more. The last thing we want is Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Ukraine. Time is short.

 

The Scots, the Catalans, the Ukrainians and the Normans

Russian thinking on Ukraine, and itself, is swimming against the tide

You're in a city where the signs are in one language, although many of the inhabitants speak another, the dominant but related language of a major power. One could be thinking of Catalan in Barcelona, or in fact Ukrainian in Kiev. I once really upset a lady from Western Ukraine by making this comparison. To her, Catalonia is only a region of a country, whereas Ukraine most certainly isn't, so the parallel seemed to her belittling. Some Catalans might well see the connection straight away however, as something approaching a majority there now talk of independence from their dominant 'neighbour'.

Such analogies are never perfect, but that hasn't stopped Russia making them publicly in its pursuit of Ukraine. The Russian Ambassador to France sat them down and patiently explained that Ukraine to Russia is like Normandy is to France-essentially inseparable. This analogy is facile though (and even if accepted, it doesn't begin to explain Russia's similar attitude to Georgia, Armenia or Moldova). I would suggest two more suitable ones, and in fact 2014 looks like being an important year for those nations in the shadow of their bigger relative, and the comparisons show just how far off the pace the Russian view is.

For the record, I personally feel more English than British (St. George's should be a public holiday and Anglo-Saxon history taught in schools), but I also feel European (EU freedom of movement is a good thing all round, including Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians), so I don't know whose agenda I'm serving here as neither UKIP nor the liberals would want me I expect. I'm also suspicious of countries that were artificial constructs-they never seem to last. Take Yugoslavia, Czechoslvakia or the USSR. Maybe even the UK? Unlike many academics, I don't consider the nations of Western and Eastern Europe to be intrinsically different. I'm sure, as I'm not from Russia I don't know much, but correct me if any of the dates are wrong. 

Scotland & Britain

The Act of Union between England and Scotland in 1707 took place just two years before Mazepa's last stand against the Russians at Poltava in 1709, so the England-Scotland and Russia-Ukraine unions have both basically existed for 300 years. As the Russians talk about 'Little Russia', the British establishment (which included Scots too by the way) promoted the idea that England would now be 'South Britain', Scotland 'North Britain' and (perhaps most optimistically) Ireland 'West Britain', although needless to say it didn't stick.

Scotland can claim two native languages. One, Gaelic, is enjoying a notable revival, now as visible on 'Welcome to Scotland' signs as "Croeso i Cymru' is in Wales. The other however, Scots, a close relative to English, is perhaps more pertinent to our loose analogy. Like Ukrainian, it has often been dismissed as a dialect of its dominant neighbour, but linguistic experts consider it a language; It has vocabulary which, in some instances, is more recognisible to, say, Norwegians than English (it also, like Ukrainian, once spread deeper into its neighbour's territory). Scots is somehow less prominent though. Like, say, Swiss German, it is rarely visible in its written form.

It used to be said that only around 25% of Scots favoured full independence, and discussion tended to revolve around North Sea oil revenues. Then came devolution, including tax raising powers, and then a Scottish National Party minority government, culminating in next September's 2014 referendum on independence. Support for breaking away is now put at a third of the population and there is a big difference between being asked a theoretical question and a real question.

Of course there is a strategy, official or otherwise, in London to try to keep the Scottish on board. Slightly echoing the situation with Ukraine, pessimism is the tool of choice here too, that Scotland variously 'wouldn't survive' and 'needs Britain'. One of the failures so far of the 'yes' campaign is to move the debate out of these narrow economic arguments which are basically about short term considerations and often based on assumptions. The debate should surely be about how Scottish people view themselves and their future, and the emotive aspect, that of cultural identity and what Scottish people feel that they are is at least as important as hospital prescriptions.

Nonetheless, you can't fault London in the sense that the issue will be decided by a referendum to the people in Scotland. Once upon a time there was a referendum on Ukrainian independence from the USSR, in fact in 1990, in which each region voted for Ukraine's independence, even the Donbas and Crimea. So if the Scots vote yes in 2014, following Russia's example, a bit of arm twisting in 20 years' time should put to rights any aberration in the Scottish vote. 

Catalonia & Spain

Iberia was overrun by the Moors while Kievan Rus was ransacked by Mongol hordes (the Arab cultural influence on Castillians is as true as the Asian influence on the Russians, but, unlike the Russian 'Eurasians', the Spanish are Europeans, and don't claim to be 'Eurafricans', 'Eurarabs' or any such nonsense). One country to emerge from the reconquista was Catalonia. Its incorporation into Spain (and France) again takes place during the 17th-18th centuries with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 coming just five years after Bohdan Khmelnytsky gave the Russians the car keys at Pereyeslav in 1654 (rather like Yanukovych has just done). Portugal could conceivably have ended up in exacty the same position (one school of thought is that Catalonia moved first, allowing Portugal to break free).

The comparison to be made between Catalan/Spanish and Ukrainian/Russian seems to me a striking one. Both languages punch below their weight; Ukrainian is Europe's 8th most spoken language while Catalan has more speakers than many of the EU's member states. The Russification of Ukraine in the Russian Empire/USSR and imposition of Castillian by Franco, changing Catalan names and place names to Spanish ones, is a familiar story for Ukrainians and Catalans alike. That strange feeling of seeing one language written on the city's street signs but hearing another more commonly spoken on the streets is common both to Kiev and Barcelona. The temptation to mix with a language that is closely related is also acute; in Ukraine that is the 'surzhik' of Russian and Ukrainian and in Catalonia the tendency to come out with Spanish words in a Catalan way rather than pure Catalan (Ukrainians might think of Prime Minister Azarov here).

In terms of an aim of independence, Catalonia on one level seems to have the furthest to go here. Madrid simply says a referendum on independence is 'illegal' but how long does an argument of that sort sit with the basics of democratic legitimacy? It's interesting to observe Catalonia's politicians appealing to the EU on this issue. As with Ukraine, the EU may not have the will or tools to assist meaningfully there either. Spain fears losing a prosperous province and the re-emergence of the Basque problem, but if Scotland and Catalonia show something that Northern Ireland and the Basque Country don't, it's that democratic means can slowly but surely nudge you closer towards your aims.

Catalans, whatever the situation, are, unlike Ukrainians and Russians, completely free to protest and express their views. Catalonia also continues to enjoy real autonomy. Had such autonomy been given to Ukraine in a hypothetical democratising 1980s USSR, perhaps Russia and Ukraine would have stayed together after all, but it's too late, Russia too autocratic, to hope to achieve this kind of outcome now. 2014 won't yield a referendum there but the zeitgeist may mean Catalonia moving closer in that direction, and it's difficult to ignore the zeitgeist.

France & Normandy?

Just to be charitable, I will entertain the Russian Ambassador's analogy a little longer. Normandy was incorporated into France in 1204 (about half a century after the founding of Moscow). The country of France itself had come into being barely 300 years earlier.

Linguistically, Normandy speaks French, and spoke French even as an independent kingdom. Norman French was even the language of royalty and administration in England for hundreds of years follwing the Norman Conquest. So where is the 19th century Norman equivalent of Taras Shevchenko writing his poems in the Norman language? Where is the national awakening? Most crucially, where is the independence movement? Need I go on?

For a better analogy however, France offers several. Look at Corsica, incorporated in 1768, and still restive. The supposedly irrefutable Russian claim to Crimea goes back to its annexation by Russia around the same time, in 1783. Western Savoy was first conquered by Napoleon in 1792, and finally cemented as a part of France in 1860. A Russian contemporary of Nice might be Sochi, founded by Russian imperial expansion in 1838 (but, unlike Nice, consolidated by the ethnic cleansing of the local Circassian population in the mid 19th century).

France in fact has 8 histrical linguistic minorities (Alsatian, Flemish, Breton, Walloon, Corsican, Catalan, Basque and Occitan) as well as numerous dialects and patois. A really interesting case would be the southern third of France, the Occitan territory. This historically spoke the 'langue d'Oc', a language more akin to Catalan. Had history developed differently, who knows if that would have become France's Ukraine?

The Russian Ambassador might have been on safer ground talking about Kievan Rus and the continuity of 'Rasiya' from 'Rus', but then you'd have to ask why France doesn't claim Franconia in Southern Germany? Best keep it simple I suppose. Imagine France bullying Belgium into accepting a role as its vassal state, installing a Francophone government with scant regard for the rights of Dutch speakers, maybe even a Flemish-hating education minister and you're somewhere closer to the mark. After all, the coal mines and steel mills of the industrial south are where the wealth is, and that's the future, surely? Sounds like the 19th century though, right?