Past articles: Right to be rememberd

In response to google's interpretation of the EU's 'right to be forgotten' legislation, I claim the 'right to be remembered'. A link to some at least some of my past articles:

The Quiet Elections
New Eastern Europe 26th September 2014

Crimea:What Comes After Non-Recognition?
New Eastern Europe 28th May 2014

The Counterintuitive Dynamics of the EU-Ukraine Relationship Euroscope (Sussex European Institute) Autumn 2011 p53

Has Change in Power Panicked European Union Into Action
Kyiv Post 11th March 2010

Ukraine voters can put Ukraine on the path to democratic legitimacy

Ukraine's presidential election is the first step to solving its government's legitimacy problem

It has not been an easy start for Ukraine's new authorities, who have had to deal with annexation, armed insurgency, rescuing the national economy from the precipice and organising a presidential election no less. A baptism of fire by anyone's standards. The annexation of Crimea came when the new incumbents had barely sat at their desks. The violent provocations in the east and south of the country are unprecedented in Ukraine's 23 years of independence, whilst Russia has a 23 year track record of violence in the Caucasus and terrorism in its cities. Draw your own conclusions about where this outbreak of 'civil war' in Ukraine has in fact come from. 

 

To add to that, the current authorities have absurdly and maliciously been labeled a 'junta' by pro-Moscow tweeters and bloggers scratching around for a smear term (the only true junta that has ever existed in Eastern Europe was the early 80s junta in Poland, which was backed by the USSR), part of a well worn tradition of concept stretching by Russia. Kiev is not a 'junta' any more than Greenpeace activists are 'pirates' or 'hooligans', or indeed gay rights campaigners 'propagandists'. Despite this however, it is true enough to say that the government since its traumatic beginnings has lacked true democratic legitimacy, and therefore Sunday's presidential elections are the crucial first step in solving a legitimacy problem with Ukraine's governance which in fact goes back to 2010.

 

When Viktor Yanukovych was elected President in early 2010, parliament was still under the mandate of the 'orange parties' of Prime Minister Tymoshenko and former President Yushchenko. What then followed was a spectacular capitulation of the whole constitutional order. The Constitutional Court, re-stuffed with judges loyal to Yanukovych, ruled that parliamentary deputies could now switch sides, the problem being that, with Ukraine's closed list electoral system, this is  tantamount to your vote growing legs and walking away from you. The defectors were dubbed 'tushki', a term meaning animal corpse. The standard of parliamentarianism thereafter soon became abysmal, with 'piano playing' (deputies pressing the voting buttons of absent members), as in the Russian Duma, becoming standard practice, and even savage beatings meted out to Yanukovych opponents. Votes were sometimes registered for MPs who were not even in the country at the time. The 2012 parliamentary elections followed electoral reforms designed to favour the President's Party of Regions. The introduction of a proportion of constituency MPs favoured the ruling parties, and electoral commissions were staffed by personnel from these same ruling parties. Unlike the previous three national elections (two parliamentary, one presidential, the election was not judged internationally to have been free and fair.

 

Fast forward to February this year, and whilst the voice of the people was finally being heard, the speed with which MPs hurriedly switched sides again following Yanukovych's exit in February was, constitutionally speaking, little better than the 'tushki' of four years earlier. Just as in 2010 a 'winner takes all' mentality saw now vulnerable deputies scrambling to save their careers and positions. There was of course a huge difference however. The new authorities from the outset took power on the promise of elections. We must remember that if not for Euromaidan, Ukraine might now have been looking ahead to years or decades without such free elections, the situation which predominates in the countries of the Customs Union that Yanukovych would have taken them into, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan 

 

What must follow these elections is constitutional reform that will guard against the monopolisation and abuse of power of the past several years. Ukraine should adopt a parliamentary system, the kind which has lead successful reforms in the likes of Poland or Czech Republic, and resist the urge to revert to the presidential model which has in contrast failed its citizens so miserably in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine must also figure out how it manages its multiculturalism without allowing the country to disintegrate. There is scope for delegating local language and schooling policy to muncipal level, as well as the dvisive issue of historical commemorations, but Ukraine lacks the political maturity for full blown federalism, so this should wait for now. Fears about Ukraine becoming a series of fiefdoms under that scenario are well founded.

 

It is also a sobering reality that they will have to face their challenges largely without the backing of the international community. Whilst the European Union has rightly put on the table a deal to allow Ukraine to access the internal market, there is plenty from member states to suggest that the EU's backing can't be relied upon, owing to the EU member states' deep ties to Russia. Whether it be German industry, French warships, Spanish ports or London's financial sector, there is little suggest that these countries will do very much to support the freedom of Ukrainians. Ukraine's road ahead looks a lonely one. The new President will need all the collective wisdom he can muster.

 

The presidential election must be followed as soon as possible by a parliamentary one. A proportion of constituency mandates must be maintained to represent occupied Crimea and the districts currently ravaged by the Russian-sponsored insurgency. The new parliament must adhere to new standards of parliamentarianism so that the abuses of the past four years cannot be repeated. If it does this, the legitimacy problem can finally be consigned to history.

Europe's New Northern Cyprus?

Non-recognition of Crimea's status as part of Russia must be more than just words

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Western leaders have all been quick to proclaim non-recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Yet just days after what could only very charitably be called a referendum on Crimea joining Russia (including a creditable 123% vote in favour in Simferopol and minus any option to remain in the country it has existed in for the past two decades) it seems the world is grudgingly accepting the inevitable, having offered only meagre sanctions, and apparently relieved that Russia appears to have settled for 'only Crimea'. If they're not careful their 'no business as usual' mantra will soon sound as tired and hollow as their 'red lines'.

In truth, Russia would probably have annexed it or set up a breakaway state there along with Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early '90s had it not massively underestimated Ukraine's divergent political direction from that of Russia. It's difficult to see whether this will fulfil Putin's aim of bringing Ukraine as a whole 'back into the fold'; the two countries now have different sides of a historical grievance to rally around.


In the here and now, clearly the most immediate pressing concern is Ukraine's isolated military units in the peninsula. Whilst both their fortitude and restraint are commendable, there is no international military backing for them whatsoever, and if more of their lives are to be spared, it seems inevitable they will have to withdraw.

Then we must consider the issue of status. There is little prospect of a treaty or formal agreement here. Making any such agreement with Russia would be a catch 22, as making any new agreement would involve formally tearing up a previous one (the 1994 Budapest Memorandum). In so doing, what possible validity could a new agreement have if it could be torn up so easily? Therefore non-recognition seems the only way forward.

For this non-recognition to make any sense however we need to figure out what non-recognition will mean in practice. Non-recognition is absolutely right, but the problem is that if Crimea is treated as a part of the Russian Federation it basically will be.  So the wherewithal of non-recognition and how it could work needs to be figured out quite quickly. As an example, Northern Cyprus is never shown on basic maps as anything other than part of the Republic of Cyprus, and this has never lapsed in 40 years. There was for a long time even a trade ban on the export of Northern Cyprus products, abolished only in 2003. Here Greece was the force to push this forward. Ukraine will be in a stronger position to push once the DCFTA with the EU is up and running.

As regards measures on the ground, non-recognition might involve cutting transport links. It seems to me that it would be adding insult to injury to allow Russian Railways to continue to operate trains to Crimea, merely 'transiting' Ukraine proper, and this is an obvious means of sanctioning the tourism industry there. There is a case for cutting rail links between Crimea and mainland Ukraine altogether in fact. In the case of Northern Cyprus, only flights from Turkey can fly into the territory. The same blockade might be enacted by the international community here. Alternative connections could be built up via, for example, Odessa.

Energy and water are also key issues. Many have pointed out that, with the ability to cut off the peninsula's water and electricity, Kiev has a potential card to play. If the prospect of a gas cut off rears its head once more, this is obviously an option. There will have to be some restraint however. A closure of the border similar to the closure the Spanish inflicted on Gibraltar for many years would only hurt families on both sides.

There should be vigorous public campaigns against organisations endorsing the change. For example, early rumours that National Geographic is to change its map may be the start of a capitulation that must be resisted through any means available. Disregarding all other arguments, it can simply be pointed out that no major power has recognised the occupation and that the case is yet to go before the International Court of Justice.


Sport is also a factor. UEFA could play a useful role in non-recognition of Crimea's Russian status. Tavriya Simferopol and FK Sevastopol currently play in the Ukrainian Premier League and should continue to do so, and UEFA has the power to make such decisions. In in albeit more innocuous example, France's Evian TG FC were refused permission to play home games across the Swiss border in Geneva as it was in another state. On this basis UEFA should refuse to allow any teams from Crimea to participate in the Russian league structure, and threaten trouble if they do, with Russia's participation in the 2014 and hosting of the 2018 tournament potentially at risk. FIFA has always taken a hard line on political interference in the running of football (at least with African countries) so it should be difficult for Russia to force UEFA's or FIFA's hand. 

Finally, there is the question of the endgame. Even the most optimistic would be hard pressed to think that Crimea will ever truly return to Ukrainian rule. Whilst before the Russian intervention it seems there wasn't a majority in favour of Russian rule, it will be equally difficult several years down the line to expect a majority to be in favour of Ukrainian rule. But it is reasonable to hope for a more legitimate settlement in Crimea in future. Little will be possible without democracy, and with Putin's situation apparently strengthened, there is little hope for the time being, but this illustrates the need for non-recognition to be maintained, for decades if need be, as with Northern Cyprus.

What Crimeans need to realise is that the dismantling of the Ukrainian letters on the front of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea represents, in effect, the dismantling of autonomy. The Russian Federation is a federation in name only, and Putin has progressively abolished autonomy across the country during his rule. A once ambitious plan for Kaliningrad, for example, to be a 'Baltic Republic' using both the rouble and the Euro and forming a gateway to the EU was, with Putin's accession to power, promptly shelved. Look at Kaliningrad now-a neglected backwater from which Russians flock across the border to shop at cheaper Polish supermarkets. Crimea is also, for now, doomed to become such a backwater, and they will see that last week's fake foray into democracy bears little relation to the future, where elections will offer no genuine choice and factual information, from a media which has moved from bias to full on North Korea style propaganda, will be scarce.

In a post-Putin scenario however, the issue will almost certainly be revisited. It could be argued that, in a democratised Russia, if given true autonomy, with full language rights for minorities, there would be little reason to complain about Russian rule. If Tatar, for example, appeared on bilingual street signs alongside Russian, few could complain. Another proposal might be independence, and a parallel might be drawn with Slovakia, where a 10% Hungarian minority, despite many tensions, ensures that the rights of minorities are addressed. An independent Crimea would have a 15% Tatar minority and a significant Ukrainian population, so in a democratic scenario, the communities would each have to be taken seriously. If by then however the non-recognition policy has lapsed, that opportunity will be lost.

Remember that after three decades of occupation, the Turkish population of Northern Cyprus in 2004 actually voted in favour of reunion with the south. Many of them have taken Republic of Cyprus citizenship (not surprisingly as this is also EU citizenship). Ukraine should consider changing the law to allow dual citizenship for all those in Crimea who wish to remain Ukrainian (it would also be in the wider interests of a country which has consistently lost citizens since 1991). A lot depends on the capacity of Ukrainians to build a successful country that will weaken the will of Crimeans to keep it in Putin's prison. If the EU follows through and grants visa free travel to Ukrainians, as it will do for Moldovans this May, the idea of having a 'Russkiy pasport' already begins to lose its appeal. For Crimea, it might be the beginning of a long road back.

How to hurt Putin

Sign the Association Agreement

The best thing the EU could do is get Acting President Turchynov on a plane to Brussels as soon as possible and sign the Association Agreement. The EU has shown itself over the past 3 months to be an utterly incompetent foreign policy actor. The extra powers won at Lisbon look ill-deserved, the posts of Foreign Policy Representative and EU President worthy of abolition at the next treaty change. However, the EU still has a massive tool at its disposal. The whole point of the Kremlin’s crusade all along has been to prevent the signing of the AA and to ensure Ukraine was on the path to the Eurasian Union, so signing the agreement would be a blow to Putin in no uncertain terms. It might even stabilise the situation across Ukraine and give opponents of the occupiers in Crimea a concrete reason to hang on to their Ukrainian passports. The Kremlin delights in knowing the west will never act so quickly and decisively. Oh that we could.

Close the Bosphorous to Russian shipping

Turkey has a role to play here, and a right to do so on a number of counts. Firstly, the Crimean Tatars, whose future inside a Russia with an awful minority rights record looks potentially appalling, are the Turks’ ethnic kin (as place names such as Kazantip or Bağçasaray bear clear testament to), so arguably Turkey has a moral obligation here, and the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey itself would support this. Turkey's media is already claiming, rather in the way that Spain does with Gibraltar, that if Crimea breaks away, it should legally revert to Turkish rule. Although that's practically impossible, it does help to legtimise Turkish involvement. Secondly, Putin’s support for Assad has had direct consequences for Turkey, bringing with it massive refugee problems. Thirdly, Russia’s asserting itself on the Black Sea has major implications for the Black Sea security situation. Turkey should close off the Bosphorous to Russian shipping and insist on a place at the table if there is mediation. Or at the very least, Russian ships passing through the straits (there have been two in recent days) ought to be 'escorted' by their Turkish counterparts. One of two warships dispatched to the fringe of the region would also concentrate minds in Moscow. Erdoğan would probably appreciate a distraction from domestic issues, including a corruption probe. They might not have a spotless record themselves on human rights, but at the moment Ukraine should take all the help it can get.

Sanctions

An obvious one, but it took a very long time indeed and many deaths before it really looked like becoming a reality for the orchestrators of the violent crackdown in Kiev. It has been claimed however, by Mikhail Saakashvili for example, that it was the crystalising of the threat of sanctions that finally lead to the collapse of Yanukovych's house of cards. Sanctions against Russian officials might also try the patience of many of Putin's backers. There is also the potential for broader economic sanctions, and with the Russian economy now on the ropes, their impact might be felt quickly.

Parliamentary or bust

Ukraine’s new political system must be a radical departure from anything seen in the post-Soviet space

It’s not new for Ukrainians to want change. Just 9 years ago, it seemed the country was embarking on a change of direction and hopes were high. This time there is caution, and remembrance that the cost this time was far higher. The frosty reception Tymoshenko has received following her release is the clearest indication of a wholehearted desire to ‘clean house’. Ukrainians at least know what they don’t want. But May’s elections will come soon and somebody needs to be steering the ship, however imperfect. Ukraine has before it a fresh sheet of paper, but it cannot aspire to build anyone’s utopia. Inclusivity and compromise are now the keys to the country’s survival and future prosperity.

One massive challenge is to engender a culture of constitutionalism. The current authorities face a legitimacy crisis. The capitulation of the previous authorities and their voting in significant numbers for new laws has created a disconcerting reverse of the ‘tushki’ phenomenon of 2010. The relationship between deputies and their electoral mandates is now tenuous, not forgetting that the parliamentary elections of 2012 were held to poor democratic standards. If Freedom House were to assess the country today, it would not be classed as free. It obviously all depends now on the coming May elections.

The first lesson that has to be learned is that politics can’t be any more about the personalities. The post-Soviet reflex of looking to a ‘strong leader’ has had disastrous results across the region for all to see. It’s time to challenge the Eurasian myth that ‘we are different’. This myth has already cost too many people in Eurasia their lives and freedoms.

Ukraine has to adopt a wholly parliamentary system of government of the type found across most of Europe. The President should be left only with the power of veto and to call new elections. A strong Prime Minister can adopt a ‘presidential style’, like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair, but note Thatcher’s political demise in 1990. She was the ‘iron lady’, but when she lost the support of her party the power drained out of her overnight. It has been objectively shown that parliamentary systems, which have to by necessity take account of a wider range of stakeholders, have a better record of achieving reforms.

The party system needs reform too. Ukraine must ditch the ‘virtual parties’ which revolve solely around personalities and business interests, and embrace ideology. The high percentage of votes at the last election for the far left (Communists) and far right (Svoboda), although perhaps regrettable, told us that at least a quarter of Ukrainian voters chose to vote along ideological lines. We need to give the more moderate centre left and centre right populations that voice too. We will have to work with those who we may not totally agree with, but a party is a coalition of interests.

To have a parliamentary system also means adherence to parliamentary rules. Post-May 2014 there should be zero tolerance of ‘piano playing’, violence in the chamber, blocking the rostrum, or any such activities. Perhaps the Verkhovna Rada needs to be ‘refereed’, with deputies suspended for some time for breaches of protocol. Otherwise, the temptation to cut corners will be very acute, and we see clearly now the result.

To preserve the unity of Ukraine, we must think about how to bring all into the political process. There is a dilemma here. There is an imperative to establish new ground rules for politics in Ukraine, and that means a new constitution. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is calling for the new constitution to be established only after elections, and for it to be subject to a referendum. That might sound reasonable enough, but there is a problem. If we look at how Yanukovych was able to take a wrecking ball to Ukraine’s constitutional structure in 2010, there is a strong argument for having the new rules in place first, but of course to have legitimacy, the whole country must be involved.

The oligarchs have a role to play here. They can continue to play a strong and influential role, just as wealthy backers of, for example, the Republicans do in America. However, in terms of the country’s assets they have to accept that their cup run is over. The EU could play a pivotal role here. Mikhael Saakashvili spoke recently about how the concrete threat of sanctions was a tipping point for many of Yanukovych’s supporters to pull the plug. If that threat hung over economic and political abuses more generally, this would limit the business elite to a role which was powerful but not excessive. What complicates this is the role of those oligarchs who failed to withdraw backing from the previous regime even as the situation deteriorated. It is more difficult to make a moral case for their continued involvement in the country’s politics, although we may find that it’s unavoidable.

How to accommodate the country’s regional differences needs much thought. At this time Ukraine lacks the political maturity for federalism, which would also leave parts of the country too vulnerable to outside interference. However, in issues such as language rights, it may make sense to allow some discretion at local level. In France, for example, minority languages can appear on street signs at the behest of local municipalities as long as the national language is also displayed (and the local municipality pays for it). This might actually be a good exercise in local democracy. Responsibility for celebrations of historical events, whether it be 9 May or the Ukrainian insurgency, should also be managed at local level, as nationally these issues have proved too divisive. Such emotive issues should not be propagandist fodder or tools for the country’s politicians any longer.

Some of the biggest issues still remain unanswered. Most significant is the threat to jobs in Eastern Ukraine from Putin’s now inevitable trade blockade. How do we explain to these people that this is not a reason to support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union, or to oppose democracy? Rather, it is an outrage that Putin is so content to exploit their jobs as a political tool, and they should be more angry about this than anyone. The impending gas price hikes are also a concern, although contingency plans such as reverse flow from Slovakia ought to now face fewer obstacles.

In dealings with Russia trust will be at an all time low, and Ukraine needs to protect itself. For the foreseeable future all high level talks between Ukraine and Russia should be hosted by a third country and adhere to diplomatic norms. We must not allow the degeneration into secret meetings and bullying that Putin-Yanukovych relations became. Plenty of work is needed into how to make Russia-Ukraine relations more transparent. The extent of Russian sabotage in Ukraine’s internal governance over the past several years is plain to see. More discussions need to be on the record and subjected to the greatest scrutiny.

Ukraine also needs to continue much of the patient hard work that in fact many of its institutions have already been doing. In the sphere of defence, it is rarely mentioned that the country, even under Yanukovych, was forming ever greater co-operation with NATO in many areas, and the previously announced transition to a professional army will probably now come to pass. European integration policy will also be salvageable after its 3 month hiatus, and with political will from the top the technical work will be able to proceed all the better.

Despite this, Ukrainians now realise that the future depends on them. The EU would be greatly welcomed as a guarantor to Ukraine’s European future, but it cannot be wholly relied upon. Following the logic of Saakashvili’s comments, had they acted earlier in the crisis, 100 more Ukrainians might still be alive today.

    

Europe's Tiananmen Must be Stopped

Some thoughts on the Ukraine crisis that I'm not hearing addressed elsewhere.


This is serious

• The clearing of Maidan would be Europe's Tiananmen Square. Europe will bear responsibility for not preventing it.

The fall of Kiev's Lenin monument, just like the fall of Budapest's Stalin statue in 1956, may not be the harbinger of victory. The Tiananmen Square protests lasted 7 weeks, with students occupying the square as Kiev's activists do now. The appearance of military vehicles on Kiev's streets evoked memories of the man who famously blocked a tank in the protests. Tens of people died in the resulting crackdown. I don't think Europe realises that they might be about to watch something similar happening on their watch. Yanukovych has already shown he is willing to militarise the city with snipers, live bullets and combat vehicles. It's uncomfortable. We wish it weren't true, but it is. Europe regrets Yugoslavia. That conflict led to a sense of moral responsibility to bring the Western Balkans into the EU accession process, but the same moral responsibility did not extend to post Orange Revolution Ukraine. That now looks like a colossal mistake. Do we want 20 years on to create more regrets for ourselves?


Sideline the EU

• Calling on the EU to help has exhausted itself. The focus needs to switch to governments of European countries instead.

Successive European treaties and treaty negotiations have long advocated greater powers, with Europe still haunted by its lack of capacity to act in Yugoslavia. Politicians spoke of European armies. These efforts finally culminated in the post of Foreign Policy Representative being created, the 'single telephone number' (in Ashton's case only until 8pm of course). The Ukraine crisis in fact shows that the EU had no business asking for greater competence in foreign policy at Lisbon. Although foreign policy competence of technically speaking ‘remains with member states’, even the pretention of EU foreign policy seems to be a pointless folly. In actual fact, it means people ‘calling on the EU’, which suits the interests of disinterested, toothless, or Russia-friendly governments, providing them with a screen for member states to hide behind. I'm beginning to think the EU should abandon its grand ambitions and revert to a looser trade pact (or be replaced by something else). Greater intergration seems to actually render it impotent altogether. And its not the fault of enlargement-some of the most vocal countries on the crisis are the newer members (e.g. Poland). It is only with a push from a Merkel, Hollande, or a Cameron that we might see the EU initiate sanctions, so it’s them that we should be holding to account for doing or not doing so.

Russian involvement

• Claims of Russian Federation personnel on Kiev’s streets, if true, urgently need to be substantiated.

We seem to know very little indeed of Russia’s direct involvement in the events in Kiev. Publicly they ‘watch with concern’, and simultaneously speak to world media about the crisis whilst their own tv channels variously downplay or grossly twist the truth of what’s happening in Kiev. Knowing from the debacle in November that set this whole thing in motion that Russia-Ukraine relations are totally untransparent, and that Yanukovych is inevitably getting desperate, it’s inconceivable that Russia is not involved in it somewhere. It might be intelligence support, assistance with cyber attacks. Who knows? I am only speculating. Most worrying are suggestions that some of the ‘Berkut’ (‘special assignment’ police forces) on the streets of Kiev are in fact Russian Berkut in Ukraine uniforms. One estimate on twiiter claimed that 8000 had been counted, but that Ukraine’s total number of Berkut amounts to only around 4000. Much earlier on, observers pointed out that Russian-speaking Berkut struggled to communicate with Ukrainian-speaking activists, difficult to account for as even Russian speakers in Ukraine are exposed to Ukrainian on a daily basis. It's entirely fair to say that it's unlikely to be true. However, such reports, if true, need to be substantiated urgently, as it would have massive implications. If Euromaidan was to be cleared by 4000 in fact Russian Berkut, it’s tantamount to sending tanks into Kiev by stealth.

 

The Sochi Factor

• Sochi 2014 gives Ukraine another 2 weeks’ grace

A window of opportunity exists now to solve the Ukraine crisis without direct Russian involvement, as Russia will never embark on a ‘Georgia 2008’ whilst its pet prestige project Sochi 2014, and associated global charm offensive, is taking place. It should be clear that Russia’s prisoner releases were, as Pussy Riot wasted no time in telling us, a publicity stunt. Many less high profile prisoners in Russia have been less fortunate, and perhaps the Russian authorities couldn’t quite hang on in letting on that Khodorkovsky will still need to be neutralized as a force, most likely unable to return. Once Sochi finishes, the gloves will be off once more. The last thing we want is Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Ukraine. Time is short.

 

The Scots, the Catalans, the Ukrainians and the Normans

Russian thinking on Ukraine, and itself, is swimming against the tide

You're in a city where the signs are in one language, although many of the inhabitants speak another, the dominant but related language of a major power. One could be thinking of Catalan in Barcelona, or in fact Ukrainian in Kiev. I once really upset a lady from Western Ukraine by making this comparison. To her, Catalonia is only a region of a country, whereas Ukraine most certainly isn't, so the parallel seemed to her belittling. Some Catalans might well see the connection straight away however, as something approaching a majority there now talk of independence from their dominant 'neighbour'.

Such analogies are never perfect, but that hasn't stopped Russia making them publicly in its pursuit of Ukraine. The Russian Ambassador to France sat them down and patiently explained that Ukraine to Russia is like Normandy is to France-essentially inseparable. This analogy is facile though (and even if accepted, it doesn't begin to explain Russia's similar attitude to Georgia, Armenia or Moldova). I would suggest two more suitable ones, and in fact 2014 looks like being an important year for those nations in the shadow of their bigger relative, and the comparisons show just how far off the pace the Russian view is.

For the record, I personally feel more English than British (St. George's should be a public holiday and Anglo-Saxon history taught in schools), but I also feel European (EU freedom of movement is a good thing all round, including Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians), so I don't know whose agenda I'm serving here as neither UKIP nor the liberals would want me I expect. I'm also suspicious of countries that were artificial constructs-they never seem to last. Take Yugoslavia, Czechoslvakia or the USSR. Maybe even the UK? Unlike many academics, I don't consider the nations of Western and Eastern Europe to be intrinsically different. I'm sure, as I'm not from Russia I don't know much, but correct me if any of the dates are wrong. 

Scotland & Britain

The Act of Union between England and Scotland in 1707 took place just two years before Mazepa's last stand against the Russians at Poltava in 1709, so the England-Scotland and Russia-Ukraine unions have both basically existed for 300 years. As the Russians talk about 'Little Russia', the British establishment (which included Scots too by the way) promoted the idea that England would now be 'South Britain', Scotland 'North Britain' and (perhaps most optimistically) Ireland 'West Britain', although needless to say it didn't stick.

Scotland can claim two native languages. One, Gaelic, is enjoying a notable revival, now as visible on 'Welcome to Scotland' signs as "Croeso i Cymru' is in Wales. The other however, Scots, a close relative to English, is perhaps more pertinent to our loose analogy. Like Ukrainian, it has often been dismissed as a dialect of its dominant neighbour, but linguistic experts consider it a language; It has vocabulary which, in some instances, is more recognisible to, say, Norwegians than English (it also, like Ukrainian, once spread deeper into its neighbour's territory). Scots is somehow less prominent though. Like, say, Swiss German, it is rarely visible in its written form.

It used to be said that only around 25% of Scots favoured full independence, and discussion tended to revolve around North Sea oil revenues. Then came devolution, including tax raising powers, and then a Scottish National Party minority government, culminating in next September's 2014 referendum on independence. Support for breaking away is now put at a third of the population and there is a big difference between being asked a theoretical question and a real question.

Of course there is a strategy, official or otherwise, in London to try to keep the Scottish on board. Slightly echoing the situation with Ukraine, pessimism is the tool of choice here too, that Scotland variously 'wouldn't survive' and 'needs Britain'. One of the failures so far of the 'yes' campaign is to move the debate out of these narrow economic arguments which are basically about short term considerations and often based on assumptions. The debate should surely be about how Scottish people view themselves and their future, and the emotive aspect, that of cultural identity and what Scottish people feel that they are is at least as important as hospital prescriptions.

Nonetheless, you can't fault London in the sense that the issue will be decided by a referendum to the people in Scotland. Once upon a time there was a referendum on Ukrainian independence from the USSR, in fact in 1990, in which each region voted for Ukraine's independence, even the Donbas and Crimea. So if the Scots vote yes in 2014, following Russia's example, a bit of arm twisting in 20 years' time should put to rights any aberration in the Scottish vote. 

Catalonia & Spain

Iberia was overrun by the Moors while Kievan Rus was ransacked by Mongol hordes (the Arab cultural influence on Castillians is as true as the Asian influence on the Russians, but, unlike the Russian 'Eurasians', the Spanish are Europeans, and don't claim to be 'Eurafricans', 'Eurarabs' or any such nonsense). One country to emerge from the reconquista was Catalonia. Its incorporation into Spain (and France) again takes place during the 17th-18th centuries with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 coming just five years after Bohdan Khmelnytsky gave the Russians the car keys at Pereyeslav in 1654 (rather like Yanukovych has just done). Portugal could conceivably have ended up in exacty the same position (one school of thought is that Catalonia moved first, allowing Portugal to break free).

The comparison to be made between Catalan/Spanish and Ukrainian/Russian seems to me a striking one. Both languages punch below their weight; Ukrainian is Europe's 8th most spoken language while Catalan has more speakers than many of the EU's member states. The Russification of Ukraine in the Russian Empire/USSR and imposition of Castillian by Franco, changing Catalan names and place names to Spanish ones, is a familiar story for Ukrainians and Catalans alike. That strange feeling of seeing one language written on the city's street signs but hearing another more commonly spoken on the streets is common both to Kiev and Barcelona. The temptation to mix with a language that is closely related is also acute; in Ukraine that is the 'surzhik' of Russian and Ukrainian and in Catalonia the tendency to come out with Spanish words in a Catalan way rather than pure Catalan (Ukrainians might think of Prime Minister Azarov here).

In terms of an aim of independence, Catalonia on one level seems to have the furthest to go here. Madrid simply says a referendum on independence is 'illegal' but how long does an argument of that sort sit with the basics of democratic legitimacy? It's interesting to observe Catalonia's politicians appealing to the EU on this issue. As with Ukraine, the EU may not have the will or tools to assist meaningfully there either. Spain fears losing a prosperous province and the re-emergence of the Basque problem, but if Scotland and Catalonia show something that Northern Ireland and the Basque Country don't, it's that democratic means can slowly but surely nudge you closer towards your aims.

Catalans, whatever the situation, are, unlike Ukrainians and Russians, completely free to protest and express their views. Catalonia also continues to enjoy real autonomy. Had such autonomy been given to Ukraine in a hypothetical democratising 1980s USSR, perhaps Russia and Ukraine would have stayed together after all, but it's too late, Russia too autocratic, to hope to achieve this kind of outcome now. 2014 won't yield a referendum there but the zeitgeist may mean Catalonia moving closer in that direction, and it's difficult to ignore the zeitgeist.

France & Normandy?

Just to be charitable, I will entertain the Russian Ambassador's analogy a little longer. Normandy was incorporated into France in 1204 (about half a century after the founding of Moscow). The country of France itself had come into being barely 300 years earlier.

Linguistically, Normandy speaks French, and spoke French even as an independent kingdom. Norman French was even the language of royalty and administration in England for hundreds of years follwing the Norman Conquest. So where is the 19th century Norman equivalent of Taras Shevchenko writing his poems in the Norman language? Where is the national awakening? Most crucially, where is the independence movement? Need I go on?

For a better analogy however, France offers several. Look at Corsica, incorporated in 1768, and still restive. The supposedly irrefutable Russian claim to Crimea goes back to its annexation by Russia around the same time, in 1783. Western Savoy was first conquered by Napoleon in 1792, and finally cemented as a part of France in 1860. A Russian contemporary of Nice might be Sochi, founded by Russian imperial expansion in 1838 (but, unlike Nice, consolidated by the ethnic cleansing of the local Circassian population in the mid 19th century).

France in fact has 8 histrical linguistic minorities (Alsatian, Flemish, Breton, Walloon, Corsican, Catalan, Basque and Occitan) as well as numerous dialects and patois. A really interesting case would be the southern third of France, the Occitan territory. This historically spoke the 'langue d'Oc', a language more akin to Catalan. Had history developed differently, who knows if that would have become France's Ukraine?

The Russian Ambassador might have been on safer ground talking about Kievan Rus and the continuity of 'Rasiya' from 'Rus', but then you'd have to ask why France doesn't claim Franconia in Southern Germany? Best keep it simple I suppose. Imagine France bullying Belgium into accepting a role as its vassal state, installing a Francophone government with scant regard for the rights of Dutch speakers, maybe even a Flemish-hating education minister and you're somewhere closer to the mark. After all, the coal mines and steel mills of the industrial south are where the wealth is, and that's the future, surely? Sounds like the 19th century though, right?

Cyprus and the UK - time to collect foreign rents?

Parochialism in the public debates in both Cyprus and the UK risks letting rich foreigners off the hook

What do Cyprus's apparently defeated bank levy proposal and the UK opposition's also defeated proposal for a 'mansion tax' have in common? Although on markedly different levels, both proposals very quickly met opposition on the grounds of hardship. In the Cypriot case that is perhaps more obvious or direct, but the mansion tax too it is claimed could lead to personal hardship for some individuals. Whilst Cypriots threatened to bulldoze their banks over the bank levy, a Radio 5 live phone in a couple of weeks ago was dominated by the hardship theme. What the two proposals also have in common is the dilemna now facing governments who, in different respects, have become attractive havens for money and investments from wealthy individuals in foreign climbs.

40% is the key figure. It is the percentage both of Cyprus bank deposits held by Russians and, coincidentally, of new properties built in London which are snapped up by foreign investors, often with no intention of living in them, so actually further exacerbating the UK housing shortage. Wealthy individuals from countries where investments are less straightforward have chosen both of these countries in their different ways for essentially similar reasons of security and future stability for their gains. This has enormous benefit if you are a Cypriot bank or a UK construction firm, but it has issues too; in Cyprus we end up with a top heavy banking sector in a tiny country, and in the UK we could say that these property investors are not paying their way for the privilege of buying the nation's leaseholds and freeholds.

The common denominator in both cases is that attempts to get these sometimes shady investors to pay into the countries from which they benefit get muffled in debates which focus on the hardships of the locals. We shouldn't belittle that. In both cases a suggested solution has been a higher threshold. Not many with savings of €100 000 or higher or with a house worth, say, £5 million or more, are going to be worrying about where their next meal is coming from (some of thee properties invested in are worth more than fifty times the 2 million threshold!). There is a reality that a pensioner who's saved all their life to have a few thousand in the bank, or a homeowner who is (only in a sense) a victim of rocketing property prices and the considerable expense and taxation associated with running a large home would suffer personal trauma under the original proposals, but the other reality, of wealthy foreign citizens who take advantage without taking responsibility, must not be ignored.

Of course there is a problem. As the Cyprus proposal shows, a more obviously targeted proposal risks making relations problematic with the governments of countries where politics, business and goodness knows what else are seamlessly intertwined, and there is no taboo about making such issues political. However, there is a deep need to reframe the debate, to educate people about the perhaps uncomfortable truth about the ways in which their countries have changed, and why it is only fair and reasonable that these people be taxed. Otherwise, we really are hurting the little guy, our ordinary citizens, whilst the big guy (crooked businessmen, even criminals) continues to fatten himself abroad unimpeded, much as he has quite likely already done back home. 

Of course the governments of free democracies, in states with free media, must listen to their citizens, but it would be a pity if, whilst having those values, we decide simply to give a free ride to dodgy individuals from the countries to our east where the media is muzzled and national parliaments are little more than corrupt dysfunctional rubber stamp institutions devoid of such social conscience. Not to mention the real little guys, millions living in poverty because of corruption, criminality and stolen state assets that have enriched many of these individuals. Surely its only right that these investors pay their way somewhere along the line.