An unlikely redemption? European free trade and resisting the Russians

The history books might be kinder to Yanukovych and Yushchenko if the EU-Ukraine free trade deal is signed

After 13 months of almost continuous bad news on Ukraine’s political landscape, the apparently positive developments in negotiations for the EU-Ukraine DCFTA are welcome, and the struggle as Russia instead seeks to wrestle Ukraine away into its ‘customs union’ is fascinating. Many commentators are looking at this as a pivotal moment in Ukraine’s future path of development. Russia offers a ‘better the devil you know’ option against the ‘what if’ possibility of maybe, just maybe, joining the European family. It appears Mr Putin left empty handed after coming to Kiev this month to state the opportunities and threats for Ukraine of joining or not joining the customs union. In declaring that Ukraine wishes to be a participant in a '3+1' format it appears Yanukovych is using an old EU tactic of setting out principles that are deliberately vague, and which could be interpreted later in a variety of ways.

There is a history of Ukraine's politicians attempting to gain 'Euro cred', going back to Kuchma's grand designs on EU membership, which were of course backed up by little substance in the way of reform. Yushchenko most energetically wrapped himself in the blue and gold, and did take some concrete steps in taking Ukraine into both the WTO the Bologna education process (the latter has since begun to be unraveled by the current administration) but failed to break the back of other necessary reforms (and gained no political capital from not doing so, if his plummeting popularity was anything to go by). Their efforts to make headway with Europe are generally judged as being a failure, and Yanukovych was subsequently elected on the pragmatic pro-Russian ticket, yet, as some predicted, his election has definitely concentrated the minds of some people in Brussels.

Although many member states are Russia-friendly, for the EU as a whole a stronger and wider Russian influence would not be altogether welcome. And Ukraine, for all its faults, still represents an opportunity to bring another 45 million people (at last count) into the single market, and serves as a possible lever for bringing in another 150 million from the former Soviet world in due time. Yanukovych was left, ironically as a legacy of the orange years, with the opportunity to conclude the free trade agreement with the EU. A whole-hearted 'Europeanisation of the oligarchs' has not taken place, but in the overall scheme of things the DCFTA has a lot to offer them as metals and chemicals exporters, and the alternative of the customs union might turn out to have risks of its own.

It’s difficult to look on the customs union as anything other than a thinly veiled neo-imperialist project, a sort of preliminary stage in attempting to re-establish the USSR/Russian Empire (Patriarch Kirill’s obsessive visits to Ukraine are difficult to explain except as part of that same project). Hence Mr Putin’s eagerness to make sure this one doesn’t get away. Russia has yet to have a Suez moment, after which it would downsize its ambitions and start to concentrate on the serious business of becoming a normal European country. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova etc. will probably have to live with this post-imperial delusionism form their eastern neighbour for some time to come.

Russia has predictably waved the carrot of cheap gas. But like the biblical Esau selling his inheritance for a single meal, selling out the entire future of Ukraine for cheap gas would be hopelessly myopic. Current studies even suggest that Eastern Ukraine might be sitting on significant reserves of shale gas, so the answer to heavy industry’s gas dependence might be right under their noses. Citing the legacy of Soviet industrial infrastructure, as Putin did during his visit, is seriously clutching at straws. Most sensible people from the Donbas admit that the system has been dismantled too far now to be reassembled. For instance, Russia now mines coal quite happily in opencast mines, so why would they go back to buying it from Ukraine? Overall, the potential benefits of the customs union do not look overwhelming, and joining could be a terrible sellout for very little return.

As a word of advice to our Russian friends, it’s the neo-imperialist undertones (overtones?) that might ultimately scare Ukraine away. After all, do the Ukrainian oligarchs really want to be reigned in as the Russian ones were? Would Ukraine be amalgamated out of existence as Tatarstan is about to be? Does anyone in Ukraine really want that? It’s about time we stopped taking the ramblings of a few nutters in Sevastopol as indicative of the predominantly Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine. The real picture is far more nuanced. On a trip to the very first village outside any major Russian-speaking city one will soon hear Ukrainian, even if it is of the hybrid ‘surzhik’ variety. Whilst there is very little overt hostility to Russia amongst the vast majority of Ukrainians (the western regions excepted), Russians overstate the feelings of Russianness in Ukraine.

Another factor is that it’s actually rather more difficult for Russia to play hard ball with this government than it was with the previous one. Yanukovych’s administration has given so many genuine concessions to Russia. The Black Sea Fleet is free to remain for a generation, Russian language is back in the ascendancy, Russia-friendly textbooks are going into the schools etc. etc. Yushchenko was easily painted as a rabid Russophobe enemy and a hand therefore poised on the gas tap, but these new people in Kiev are supposed to be their friends, even now aping many features of the Putinist approach, imitation being after all the sincerest form of flattery. Andrew Wilson has argued that Yanukovych's pro-Russian stance might paradoxically actually make it easier for Ukraine to somehow manoeuvre itself into the European sphere. Can Russia really fight the Yanukovych government having seen during the long orange years what the alternative might be?

However, the EU road looks long and often far from promising. There are some apparently persuasive arguments for abandoning negotiations with the EU, particularly in the current climate. Too many big EU states are now obstructing enlargement, the EU is ridden with all kinds of crises and going against the will of Russia could be a major headache. One can also understand Ukrainian pessimism towards Europe. Look at Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership which dates back to 1987 when it was deferred to ‘more favourable times’ which more than 20 years later show no signs of arriving (the European Commission clearly refrained from offering Ukraine the prospect of even eventual membership to avoid being put in the same position again). However, if the prize of membership has eluded the Turks thus far, they have still developed positively on economic, democratic and, to at least some extent, on human rights indicators. Ukraine could do with at least the same Europeanising force that Turkey has gotten from long term political engagement with Brussels. The journey is as important as the destination.

If the DCFTA is really the road to Europe, it could be a very long road indeed, but it beats the dead end of the customs union. Yet Brussels could be doing more. Putting off visa liberalisation for Ukraine because of the North African problem, as has been rumoured recently, doesn’t really follow sound logic. What’s the link between Libyans fleeing a civil war and Ukrainians trying to visit France, Spain or Hungary for their holidays? They might even spend money there, at a time when you would think EU states could do with the cash (?). More importantly, if they like what they see, they might bring some of those ideas home. We all know that some Ukrainians overstay, but there is no reason why automatic visas could not be granted for those who have already shown from previous trips that they can adhere to the rules. For now, Europe sends out to thousands of Ukrainians every year a message of rejection and inferiority, so no wonder some have already given up.

But finally, if this isn’t a flight of fancy, just supposing Ukraine does enter a common free trade area with the EU, and supposing over time it does well out of it, and edges incrementally closer and closer to real and meaningful European integration. The historical legacies of Ukraine’s soap opera politicians might one day be seen in a completely different light. The passage of Ukraine into first the WTO under Yushchenko, and then the DCFTA under Yanukovych might paint them as unlikely founding fathers of a European future for Ukraine. After that who knows? Visa free travel? EU membership? The Euro? Imagine that.

If Ukraine was run like Shakhtar (and vice versa)

The benefits to Ukraine’s ruling classes of meritocracy ought to be clear...

For all the bad publicity the country gets, Shakhtar Donetsk bucks the trend. They lifted the UEFA Cup in 2009 and their 6-2 aggregate demolition of Roma in the previous round was astonishing. They’re currently sitting pretty 12 points ahead of arch rivals Dynamo at the top of the Ukrainian league. Of course such success didn’t grow out of the ground. Obviously Shakhtar are rather well-resourced by their billionaire owner. But whilst it’s tempting to dwell on the rights or wrongs of where this money might have come from, there’s another rather interesting point to be made, which bucks the trend in today’s Ukraine. Whilst Shakhtar have been flying, the country has meanwhile been relegated from democracy’s ‘Premier League’ (the ‘free country’ status previously afforded it by Freedom House), tumbled down press freedom ratings and virtually languishes in the amateur league of the Global Competitiveness Index. So what is it that Shakhtar does differently?

A look at the team sheet tells us the roots of this success. The Shakhtar team that started both games against Roma contained only three Ukrainians. Of the six goals they scored, five were scored by Brazilians and one by a Czech. Now I’m not in any way out to belittle Ukrainian football. Ukraine has a fine historical pedigree in the game, going back to Dynamo Kiev’s European successes in the 1980s, or the Dynamo team that got so close to making the Champions’ League final in 1999. On one occasion the entire USSR football team was selected from Dynamo Kiev, and Ukrainian teams and players were heavyweights in Soviet times. They play a technical, passing game that has its good points. Nonetheless, Ukraine is 33rd in the (albeit slightly dodgy) FIFA World Rankings, so if you want to mix it with the best, you need to bring in the best, and that’s what Shakhtar have done. Whether it will be enough against Barcelona tonight is another question entirely, but there’s no doubt that the likes of Luiz Adriano and Jádson are top quality. Brazil produces the world’s best footballers, so it makes sense to recruit the best.

Sport is probably the ultimate meritocracy, and it’s laudable that Shakhtar have realised that in football you need to bring in the best people to do the job. But given the links between that very football club and the current ruling class, it’s difficult to understand why the same policy would not be best employed in some of the more important aspects of running the country. On the economy, why not bring in experts with a track record of successful economic reform, such as from Slovakia or Poland. On rule of law, why not bring in experts from countries which, for example, rank high on the WJP Rule of Law Index. The Germans could give pointers on how to run a de-politicized Constitutional Court or a successful National Bank. Foreign experts could be used to much greater effect in the preparations for Euro 2012. And so it goes on. The alternative is ineffective institutions run by poorly-qualified cronies ill-suited to their roles. The rampant cronyism of Ukrainian society means ignoring the people who might be best for the job in favour of the well-connected. That leads in the end to chronically ineffective management, such as was seen in the Scottish police, when the promotion of too many freemasons to leading positions led to officers needing to be brought up from England to solve major crimes.

To best illustrate the point, imagine that Shakhtar was run in the way that Ukraine is. Shakhtar is a Ukrainian team and should have Ukrainian players. As captain we’ll bring back our captain from 10 years ago when we were we were bottom of the league and judged to be a poor side. He was already in his 50s then and, at 63 looks well past it, but he’s a mate of the head coach so gets the nod. In midfield we’ll bring back another old hand. He was dropped by the previous coach but acts as an intermediary, contributing nothing to the team, but demanding half of the team’s wages for just standing in the middle. Up front we could put a mate of the Coach’s son. He looks decidedly overweight, has only ever played pub football and doesn’t feel up to attending the press conference to tell us how he’s going to carve open the Barça defence. The team is very likely going to bomb in every match from now on, but never mind, the club website and programme notes will still accentuate the positive and tell us that we shouldn’t expect better.

Ukraine to be fast-tracked to EU membership?

A news release that’s today been brought to my attention.

Ukraine is set to be offered EU membership by the end of the decade, according to a leaked memo from Berlaymont. The change of heart happened after high-ranking Brussels officials said that ‘when they looked into their eyes, they believed in the sincerity of the country’s reforms’. The EU is apparently so impressed by Ukraine’s efforts in cleaning up corruption, the rule of law, and bringing stability that they are ready to offer Kiev an unprecedented promise of fast-track membership. Progress on the free trade agreement with the EU has stormed ahead and the Eastern European ‘tiger economy’ shows no signs of slowing. “We simply cannot ignore the progress they have made”, said an unnamed Brussels source. “We could do with some of that stability here in Brussels”, he added. It is thought that the allure of Ukraine’s fields of wheat, steel mills and horilka was just too good for the supranational body to turn down.

There had been fears that the EU was suffering from ‘enlargement fatigue’ with too many members, but the EU plans to solve this by expelling Greece from the union. That country also faces expulsion from NATO if it does not change its name, as US authorities have apparently deemed the name too similar to that of the 1971 musical Grease, and fear a loss of revenue from intellectual property rights.

The accession process will be a streamlined version of the one that former communist countries have previously undergone. The famous acquis communautaire will be replaced by non-binding promises of reform and traditional accession negotiations will be replaced by demands and banging fists on the table. As part of the process, negotiators will occasionally be allowed to travel to Brussels if they’ve behaved themselves and don’t drink too many Mort Subites on nights out while they’re over there. They will travel visa free but will be given Mastercards to cover any unnecessary extravagances. In preparation for Ukraine’s membership, Members of the European Parliament will be issued with gym membership and running shoes as, as one MEP admitted, running round pressing the voting buttons in a chamber of that size will be ‘quite a task’. They will also expand the Commission’s Gentlemen’s Club as they won’t be bringing any women with them, apart from the standard concubines. Facilities for the elderly will also be expanded, including zimmer frames for senior Ukrainian politicians.

There is some disappointment that Ukraine will not be joining the union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the other Chinese frontier provinces, but provision of warm blankets and cups of hot cocoa for the winter will form part of the EU’s pre-accession aid package and should do the trick on those chilly winter nights when the gas is switched off. Further funding will also be made available for a construction site and associated partially-completed facilities for the European Fuss Ball Championships due to be held sometime in the near future but we’ve still got a couple of years or so left, haven’t we? “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to host the tournament”, said the head of the organising committee with a smile.

Upon accession, Ukrainians will be one step ahead of their EU brethren, having left school one year earlier. It has been agreed that school textbooks will be EU-friendly, omitting painful chapters such as the Cold War, the EU constitution and the accession of Greece. After all, there’s no point in people making themselves upset for nothing. In addition to Ukrainian, Bollocks will be made a second state language as apparently a majority of the ruling classes in the country actually talk Bollocks.