Ukraine’s new political system must be a radical departure from anything seen in the
post-Soviet space
It’s not new
for Ukrainians to want change. Just 9 years ago, it seemed the country was
embarking on a change of direction and hopes were high. This time there is
caution, and remembrance that the cost this time was far higher. The frosty
reception Tymoshenko has received following her release is the clearest
indication of a wholehearted desire to ‘clean house’. Ukrainians at least know
what they don’t want. But May’s elections will come soon and somebody needs to
be steering the ship, however imperfect. Ukraine has before it a fresh sheet of
paper, but it cannot aspire to build anyone’s utopia. Inclusivity and
compromise are now the keys to the country’s survival and future prosperity.
One massive
challenge is to engender a culture of constitutionalism. The current
authorities face a legitimacy crisis. The capitulation of the previous
authorities and their voting in significant numbers for new laws has created a
disconcerting reverse of the ‘tushki’ phenomenon of 2010. The relationship
between deputies and their electoral mandates is now tenuous, not forgetting
that the parliamentary elections of 2012 were held to poor democratic
standards. If Freedom House were to assess the country today, it would not be
classed as free. It obviously all depends now on the coming May elections.
The first
lesson that has to be learned is that politics can’t be any more about the
personalities. The post-Soviet reflex of looking to a ‘strong leader’ has had
disastrous results across the region for all to see. It’s time to challenge the
Eurasian myth that ‘we are different’. This myth has already cost too many people
in Eurasia their lives and freedoms.
Ukraine has
to adopt a wholly parliamentary system of government of the type found across
most of Europe. The President should be left only with the power of veto and to
call new elections. A strong Prime Minister can adopt a ‘presidential style’,
like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair, but note Thatcher’s political demise in
1990. She was the ‘iron lady’, but when she lost the support of her party the
power drained out of her overnight. It has been objectively shown that
parliamentary systems, which have to by necessity take account of a wider range
of stakeholders, have a better record of achieving reforms.
The party
system needs reform too. Ukraine must ditch the ‘virtual parties’ which revolve
solely around personalities and business interests, and embrace ideology. The
high percentage of votes at the last election for the far left (Communists) and
far right (Svoboda), although perhaps regrettable, told us that at least a
quarter of Ukrainian voters chose to vote along ideological lines. We need to
give the more moderate centre left and centre right populations that voice too.
We will have to work with those who we may not totally agree with, but a party
is a coalition of interests.
To have a
parliamentary system also means adherence to parliamentary rules. Post-May 2014
there should be zero tolerance of ‘piano playing’, violence in the chamber,
blocking the rostrum, or any such activities. Perhaps the Verkhovna Rada needs
to be ‘refereed’, with deputies suspended for some time for breaches of protocol.
Otherwise, the temptation to cut corners will be very acute, and we see clearly
now the result.
To preserve
the unity of Ukraine, we must think about how to bring all into the political
process. There is a dilemma here. There is an imperative to establish new
ground rules for politics in Ukraine, and that means a new constitution. Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is calling for the new constitution to be
established only after elections, and for it to be subject to a referendum.
That might sound reasonable enough, but there is a problem. If we look at how
Yanukovych was able to take a wrecking ball to Ukraine’s constitutional structure
in 2010, there is a strong argument for having the new rules in place first,
but of course to have legitimacy, the whole country must be involved.
The oligarchs
have a role to play here. They can continue to play a strong and influential role,
just as wealthy backers of, for example, the Republicans do in America.
However, in terms of the country’s assets they have to accept that their cup
run is over. The EU could play a pivotal role here. Mikhael Saakashvili spoke
recently about how the concrete threat of sanctions was a tipping point for
many of Yanukovych’s supporters to pull the plug. If that threat hung over
economic and political abuses more generally, this would limit the business
elite to a role which was powerful but not excessive. What complicates this is
the role of those oligarchs who failed to withdraw backing from the previous
regime even as the situation deteriorated. It is more difficult to make a moral
case for their continued involvement in the country’s politics, although we may
find that it’s unavoidable.
How to accommodate
the country’s regional differences needs much thought. At this time Ukraine
lacks the political maturity for federalism, which would also leave parts of
the country too vulnerable to outside interference. However, in issues such as
language rights, it may make sense to allow some discretion at local level. In
France, for example, minority languages can appear on street signs at the
behest of local municipalities as long as the national language is also
displayed (and the local municipality pays for it). This might actually be a
good exercise in local democracy. Responsibility for celebrations of historical
events, whether it be 9 May or the Ukrainian insurgency, should also be managed
at local level, as nationally these issues have proved too divisive. Such
emotive issues should not be propagandist fodder or tools for the country’s
politicians any longer.
Some of the
biggest issues still remain unanswered. Most significant is the threat to jobs
in Eastern Ukraine from Putin’s now inevitable trade blockade. How do we explain
to these people that this is not a reason to support Ukraine’s accession to the
Customs Union, or to oppose democracy? Rather, it is an outrage that Putin is
so content to exploit their jobs as a political tool, and they should be more
angry about this than anyone. The impending gas price hikes are also a concern,
although contingency plans such as reverse flow from Slovakia ought to now face
fewer obstacles.
In dealings
with Russia trust will be at an all time low, and Ukraine needs to protect
itself. For the foreseeable future all high level talks between Ukraine and
Russia should be hosted by a third country and adhere to diplomatic norms. We
must not allow the degeneration into secret meetings and bullying that Putin-Yanukovych
relations became. Plenty of work is needed into how to make Russia-Ukraine
relations more transparent. The extent of Russian sabotage in Ukraine’s
internal governance over the past several years is plain to see. More
discussions need to be on the record and subjected to the greatest scrutiny.
Ukraine also
needs to continue much of the patient hard work that in fact many of its
institutions have already been doing. In the sphere of defence, it is rarely
mentioned that the country, even under Yanukovych, was forming ever greater
co-operation with NATO in many areas, and the previously announced transition
to a professional army will probably now come to pass. European integration
policy will also be salvageable after its 3 month hiatus, and with political
will from the top the technical work will be able to proceed all the better.
Despite this,
Ukrainians now realise that the future depends on them. The EU would be greatly
welcomed as a guarantor to Ukraine’s European future, but it cannot be wholly
relied upon. Following the logic of Saakashvili’s comments, had they acted
earlier in the crisis, 100 more Ukrainians might still be alive today.
