Is there a European alternative to the Brussels project?

An 'outer ring' of European states could pursue looser integration and have collective clout

If the UK is truly heading towards an 'in or out' referendum on EU membership, thoughts must be turning quickly towards what alternative model the UK-Europe relationship might follow. The options are not straightforward.
 
One common retort from British Eurosceptics is 'look at Norway', but that option is not as great as it may look at first glance. A Norwegian local politician I met a couple of years back lamented her country's unwillingness to join the EU, saying that Norway has to implement 95% of EU legislation, with a 0% say about what goes into it. They do have control over their fishing industry, but many aspects of their lives come under the remit of EU directives that no Norwegian had a hand in drafting. Iceland also has this deal but has now decided to seek full EU membership instead.

Very few who truly understand the issues think that Britain can simply have no form of economic integration with the EU, and even Nigel Farage's language has become more nuanced during his time in Brussels. If Britain, for example, was to leave the EU, but desire to continue to participate in the single market, it would have to accept something similar to the EEA deal. Switzerland, on the other hand, has a series of bilateral opt-ins and opt-outs of EU policies, but on many issues it is captive to the regime that surrounds it.

'Tory Euroscepticism' may be the driving force behind Cameron's decision, but British Eurosceptics are not a homogeneous group. There are the rabid 'bent banana' Eurosceptics who ignore the geographical reality of where our island sits, and for whom there is no distinction between EU migrant workers and illegal immigrants from elsewhere in the world, and who conveniently ignore the hundreds of thousands of Brits residing in other EU states. There are still some with delusions about the UK's potential global role, or farcical ideas that Americans, Australians or Indians would be 'delighted' to open up to preferential economic agreements with the UK. There is the frequently-coined argument that when Britain voted in the 1970's it voted to join an economic union, not a political one, but a look at the founding treaties of the EU makes clear that it was all along a politically-coloured project. 

Then there are quite reasonable arguments made about the democratic deficit in the EU's institutions. There is also the technical constitutional argument, which relatively few mention but which holds some water, about the incompatibility of the EU's system with the British system, that the British constitutional principle that 'no parliament can bind its successor' is broken by the signing of European treaties. That explains how figures on the left such as Tony Benn came to be part of British Euroscepticism.

So Britain, Norway, and Switzerland might all have reasons to be less than satisfied with their position, but they are not alone in feeling that their deals with Brussels are in some way unsatisfactory. Across Europe, on the eastern frontier, we have Turkey, the candidate country which may never join, which so far has only a customs agreement with the EU which is of limited value. Then there is Ukraine, which may or may not one day get round to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreement with the EU, but whose problems with democracy and the rule of law may leave it self-excluded. Georgia, Moldova and Armenia are all in the process of agreeing similar free trade deals with Europe, and the DCFTA model may be what Turkey eventually has to settle for, if it doesn't decide that a sub-optimal relationship with Europe does not outweigh the benefits of a multi-vector trade policy, given its geographical position and robust pre-crisis economic growth. 
 
During European debates in the UK, going back to the 1990's, the phrase 'two-speed Europe' frequently came up, implying that France, Germany, Benelux, Spain, Italy etc. could push ahead with closer integration whilst, for example, Britain and the Nordic countries could take a slower approach. Only in one sense has this clearly manifested itself, but notably, in the EU states that did not choose to adopt the Euro. One might also sense that one or two newer EU members, longer term, might not desire the closest level of integration with other member states. Would Poland, for example, ever really want to end up in political union with Germany?


So, if Britain is twitchy, Norway disadvantaged, Turkey rejected and Ukraine self-excluded, not to mention Switzerland and Iceland in Europe but not the EU, should these countries think about getting together in some kind of trade organisation, which could collectively lobby Brussels? If the EU had a rival club of 8-10 countries with which it had to agree single market conditions, might those countries together have real influence? In the longer term, such a consortium might be able to get Israel or Russia/Belarus/Kazakhstan on board (in a post-Putin epoch) and then you are talking about a rival group with tremendous clout. After all, if all these countries are either unhappy being under the EU's thumb, or given the cold shoulder by it, doesn't it make sense to look at other options? A looser organisation might also be able to more effectively involve Europe's southern neighbourhood.


There would be nothing to stop the group of non-EU members here (to list, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro) to sit down and discuss common interests and possible future co-operation. This is admittedly just an idea and hasn't been fully thought through, but perhaps not all roads in Europe lead to Brussels (?). 

I'll freely admit that this is a rehash of a 2011 article on the same blog. The relevance of the issue persists.

Ukraine's ideology problem

The rise of Svoboda, though regrettable, can't be viewed out of context

At the start of the year, probably in a slow week for news, the BBC finally got wind of the right wing phenomenon that is Svoboda. Its report was not very different to similar previous reports on other right wing groups, such as Hungary’s Jobbik. After all, in 2012 the BBC had already put lots of effort into telling us about the kinds of attitudes that apparently only exist in Eastern Europe. Ritualistic activities make the best footage, and it’s not difficult to get some quotes from a party member sounding forth reprehensible views, most worryingly the abhorrent and baffling anti-semitism that pre-occupies right wing groups across Central and Eastern Europe, long after the Jewish communities in these countries were savagely almost completely extinguished. There are certainly things to worry about, not least the unchecked veneration of the controversial Stepan Bandera, but reports about the right wing resurgence ignore the wider context of Ukraine’s political landscape at their peril.

Take history, for example. It was the Party of Regions, not Svoboda, which closed access to the SBU archives that had been open during the Yushchenko era. At that time the authorities also handed control of the country’s National Institute of Memory to the Communist Party. Since then it has aggressively pushed the Soviet-era narrative of World War II in schools and in the gaudy Victory Day celebrations. Against this background of limiting rational and impartial historical research and promoting national myths, it is not difficult to see how Svoboda now has fertile ground to promote the Bandera narrative. Contrast this with the breakthrough over the past few years in Holodomor remembrance which means that even pro-Russian politicians are seen at the memorials on remembrance day. The airing of historical evidence has doubtless helped enormously in making this possible, and superseded the heated debate over whether it should be classed as genocide.

The authorities and those that came before them have also laid fertile ground in a host of other ways. A push for what might be termed as ‘Galician nationalism’ epitomised by the vindictive Education Minister, was soundly rejected by Ukrainians at the polls. Svoboda’s strong showing in Kiev oblast shows that any kind of Galician nationalism, or an attempt to put a wedge between Western and Central Ukraine, is a non-starter, and doesn’t even depend on voters being Russian or Ukrainian-speaking. Don’t forget that Galicia (Halychyna) in fact also extends into Poland (Galicja) and the concept is of little relevance to modern Ukrainians, many of whom clearly value national unity.

Svoboda was heavily implicated in the recent fighting in the Verkhovna Rada, and Udar rightly praised for standing back, but let us not forget that it is not Svoboda that created Ukraine’s parliamentary thugocracy, as some nasty beatings in the previous parliament illustrate. Ukraine’s lack of proper parliamentarianism goes back a long time. Support for banning multiple-voting (‘piano playing’) by MPs is an easy gold sticker for Svoboda. The European Parliament’s plea to the other opposition parties not to co-operate with Svoboda seems like a non-starter when crucial votes on such issues could make all the difference, and with such disregard across the board for constitutional principles. It is also inconsistent with previous cases within the EU, such as in Slovakia when Robert Fico’s Smer party went into coalition with the anti-Hungarian Slovak National Party (whose leader proclaimed his wish to roll tanks into Budapest). Shouldn’t the European Parliament have taken a similar stance then?

The success of Svoboda, and the Communists, also point to a need in Ukrainian politics to return to ideology. The personality parties of the last 20 years have done little to enable debate about the best course the country should take, and the affinities the major parties have claimed along ideological lines with the groupings of the European Parliament have ranged from tenuous to bogus. The re-emergence of the left and the right ought to concentrate the minds of those in the centre, particularly if ideology now counts for at least 1 in 4 of the country’s voters. Ukraine must take more steps towards functioning parliamentarianism rather than strong presidentialism, as studies have proved that the former model is more effective at enabling reform than the latter, much as this is counter-intuitive to many in the former USSR.

Svoboda may also be addressing another major gap in the country’s political life, that of civic activism, appearing keen to get involved in issues ranging from shale gas to industrial relations. This is a glaring gap that the major parties have left to be exploited. A Kiev friend tells of how, shortly after the Orange Revolution, her mother, a private medical practitioner and educated woman, called in at the offices of the Tymoshenko bloc asking how she could meaningfully contribute to the party’s work; the answer was that she could if she wished distribute leaflets and that no other service was required as the aim was simply to gain and retain power. It’s not difficult to see how Svoboda’s involvement in issues that matter to people, even if opportunistic, would resonate. Ukrainians occasionally show a penchant for direct action, blocking a railway line at Kharkiv or breaking down fences around beaches in Crimea. If Svoboda can tap into those grievances, they’ll be onto a winner.

However, a note of caution against becoming a Svoboda apologist. A student of mine here in Warsaw puts it in succinct terms; “my grandfather’s family was killed by Bandera”. The black marks against Svoboda are black indeed.