The European
Parliament’s most recent resolution on Ukraine (although the EP does not have
competence, in the technical sense, on foreign policy) gives the general
flavour of the way things are going: “Ukraine’s human rights
record, its respect for civil liberties and fundamental freedoms and for the
rule of law, with the incorporation of fair, impartial and independent legal
processes, and its focus on internal reform are prerequisites for the further
development of relations between the EU and Ukraine.” Or read another way, Ukraine’s ever-increasing lack
of it more or less puts a hold on further European integration, whether the
President declares a ‘pause’ or not. Ukraine’s conduct has actually forced the
EU to redefine the whole Association Agreement dialogue. From being a largely
technical process the proceedings have, almost by necessity, now taken on an
implicitly political character.
There is still some tinkering
going on to try to save face. The phrase ‘political detainees’ was softened to ‘prisoners sentenced on politically motivated grounds’, owing to Ukraine's request to the Council of Europe to
define ‘political detainee’, which it declined to do. However, for all the
technicalities, Tymoshenko is clearly the deal breaker (not necessarily rightly),
and on its chief demand it looks as if there will be no joy for the west. The ‘anachronistic’
laws that put her there have not been repealed and the queue of new charges may
be a bid to prevent even the European Court of Human Rights giving her a clean
slate. Personally I’m not so sure that her staying in prison is simply the
personal vendetta of other politicians, but rather a pragmatic move, seeing as
her time in office allegedly lost certain individuals large sums of money. A
freed Tymoshenko back in office might block revenue streams to certain
individuals, and that’s money, after all.
With the EU
relationship bringing only bad cheer, Ukraine hoped the NATO Summit in Chicago
would be an avenue for more positive developments but, in the end, most of the
delegations refused to have meetings with Yanukovych. Of those that did, Poland
and Romania chastised Ukraine over the political prisoners issue, leaving only
Afghanistan, where the focus was simply on reconstruction projects that Ukraine
could gain there. NATO also joins the EU’s chorus, in the summit declaration,
over ‘selective applications of justice’. Meanwhile, there were signs that Georgia,
for example, is slowly inching towards membership, even despite its territorial
issues. NATO will still co-operate with Ukraine where it needs to, for example
with the use of Ukraine’s helicopters, but from the ill-deserved positive publicity
given Yanukovych for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament (a free gift from Obama), Ukraine’s
role this time is more as an extra than as a star.
So with the EU
relationship crumbling, the IMF out of the picture, and NATO getting lukewarm,
we are left with the opaque and baffling dealings between Ukraine and Russia.
Following the Russian ban on Ukrainian cheese and the tit-for-tat (sort of) ban
on Belarusian dairy products (vive la Customs Union!) things seem to be
settling down there. Of course, the main discussion is one of gas.
Firstly, there are the
contracts that Tymoshenko supposedly ‘illegally’ signed, but which Ukraine
doesn’t seem to be able to get itself out of, with not even initial signs of a
Russian shift in position. The Black Sea Fleet deal of 2010 was seemingly for
nothing. Yet, with the lack of other options, Ukraine is still trying to cut a
deal with Russia.
The old chestnut of
the tri-partite ownership of Ukraine’s gas pipelines is being trotted out once
again. This, in the end, would also most likely yield nothing in return. The
whole concept of the ‘EU share’ is nonsense to start with. Pipelines are not
operated in the EU as geopolitical concerns. Countries do not own pipelines and
there is certainly no precedent for supra-national ownership of gas pipelines,
so what we are talking about is two thirds ownership by the Russian and
Ukrainian state, and one third ownership from a company or consortium from the
EU, and that invites most likely a deal with Gazprom.
That leads onto the
second drawback, which is that even if Ukraine’s drive for shale gas extraction
is successful (and awarding concessions in a relatively straightforward way to
Shell and Chevron was a good start), Ukraine may find itself unable to realise
the potential of shale gas if there are restrictions on its distribution
because of unhelpful pipeline operators owing to an ill-conceived,
short-termist pipeline deal. To add to this, experts say Russia is unlikely to
even pay the proper market price for the GTS. Ukraine fears the loss of transit
traffic, but because of a European Commission stipulation that no more than 50%
of the gas through Nord Stream can be Gazprom’s, Gazprom will still need
Ukraine’s gas transit for the time being.
There are also
various permutations that are largely unforeseeable, and here is mere
speculation. If Russia can in future put most of its gas through Nord Stream
and South Stream, and if Ukraine is by then pumping out shale gas, won’t it
then be just a hindrance to have Russian involvement in Ukraine’s GTS. As an
aside, what will be the effect of shale gas extraction being successful. One
fear is that it might in fact all be exported, and the profits used in exactly
the same way as Gazprom’s are, to support a ‘Putin-lite’ in Ukraine. After all,
the lack of imagination of Ukraine’s rulers invariably leads them to look to
Russia for inspiration.
As one commentator
wrote recently, Ukraine perhaps overestimates its geopolitical importance. When
push comes to shove, the west already has plenty of friends on the Black Sea.
Russia’s interest is as chauvinistic as it is strategic (surely, in theory, a new
modern naval port on Russia’s own Black Sea coast would be far more efficient
and pertinent to Russian national security than maintaining their ‘museum’ in
Sevastopol, but when a feeble pretension to a naval port in Syria is enough to
sanction the deaths of thousands of people, we know that common sense is not at
work here).
Ukraine’s problem
will be that, if the elections this October fail the democratic litmus test, it
matters less and less what foreign policy direction Ukraine proclaims. If the
standards of democracy, rule of law, and management of the economy converge
ever more closely with those of the member states of the Customs Union, then
that may be the country’s default destination.
